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ABSTRACT
The French Revolution ushered in a period of political unrest in France which appeared
never-ending, even when a seemingly stable government rose to power. After a series of failed
Republican governments, Napoleon Bonaparte seized control on 18 Brumaire VIII, promising to
uphold the revolutionary ideals that had permeated the nation. As time passed, however, it
became clear that he aimed at gathering all political power for himself. With his consular and
imperial regimes accepted by French citizens, Napoleon effectively returned the country to
autocratic rule.
Needing talented officials to serve in his military, ministries, and prefectures, Napoleon
enlisted the services of men whose ideologies ranged from Republican, to monarchist, to
imperialists. Relying on officials whose political beliefs conflicted with those of the current
regime engendered instability within his new government, making it possible for any
enterprising political hopeful to strike a devastating blow against the Empire. Throughout the
Napoleonic era, many dissidents attempted to overthrow Bonaparte’s regimes, but only one man
achieved enough success to unsettle the Emperor’s belief that his government was secure.
General Claude-François de Malet was a fervent Republican and despite frequent prison
breaks and constant denunciations of Napoleon and his government, few people considered him
a serious threat. Opinion would change after the night of 22 October 1812. The event, simply
known as the Malet Conspiracy, was the single most successful coup attempted against the
Napoleonic regime. During this attempt, Malet successfully deceived several high-ranking
military officials, prompting them to place their troops under his control. The readiness with
which these men followed Malet’s orders without question speaks to the fragility of Napoleon’s
Empire, even among those he considered his most trustworthy devotees. Fearing that his Empire
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was on the verge of collapse, Napoleon chose to return to Paris from Russia only after hearing of
the events set into motion by Malet. After the nearly successful attempt, it became clear to
Napoleon that running an imperial government required close, personal supervision, especially in
the homeland of liberté, égalité, and fraternité.
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INTRODUCTION
Material written on various aspects of the Napoleonic era has reached nearly
unimaginable levels. In fact, “there are actually more published sources on Napoleon than there
are days since he died—as of 5 May 1990, the 169th anniversary of his death, there will be
61,685 volumes.”1 Historians have seemingly addressed every possible topic and every possible
piece of legislation or correspondence from every possible angle. Yet, as more historians enter
the field new perspectives illuminate old topics. The discovery of new letters, diaries, and other
archival sources casts old evidence in a new light. The job of the historian is, therefore, to
continue telling the story of the past as it evolves, even if the mountain of books on a particular
topic seems sufficient.
Authors of initial accounts about life and events during Napoleon’s reign intended their
works to ingratiate themselves with the new monarchical regime of Louis XVIII. Portrayals of
the Emperor ranged from Satan incarnate, an opinion held by some even during his reign, to the
ultimate enemy of the Revolution. The very people who had benefited most from imperial rule,
including Napoleon’s most trusted and high-ranking military and political officials, wrote such
accounts. The Emperor was not always unaware of their duplicitous nature. He knew, for
example, of the anti-Bonapartist sentiment in the heart of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand.
Despite Talleyrand’s less than loyal opinion, Napoleon never revoked his position, even when
evidence surfaced that he had been responsible for instigating Czar Alexander’s increasingly
negative attitude toward the Emperor. Perhaps the Emperor simply wanted to abide by the
ancient Chinese proverb, “keep your friends close, but your enemies closer.”
One enemy Napoleon did not hold close enough was General Claude-François de Malet.
In 1808, Malet found himself under arrest for having organized an attempt to overthrow the
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imperial government. Even after this failure, he was not yet ready to silence his dissatisfaction
with the regime. Nevertheless, despite his frequent prison breaks and constant denunciations of
both Napoleon and his government, few people looked upon Malet as a serious threat. Opinion
would change after the night of 22 October 1812. On this occasion, Malet not only escaped but
also managed to arrest several key political figures. The event, simply known as the Malet
Conspiracy, was the single most successful coup attempted against the Napoleonic regime.
To discuss the importance of Malet’s conspiracy, an understanding of the key figures
involved and the social atmosphere of France at the time is required. A number of French
sources provide comprehensive biographical information about high-ranking officials in
Napoleon’s regime. One such resource is Jean Savant’s Les Ministres de Napoléon (1959). Of
specific interest to Malet’s plot are Savant’s accounts of Jean-Jacques de Cambacérès, Second
Consul during the early years of Napoleon’s rule, Henri Clarke, minister of war, Joseph Fouché,
minister of general police, and Armand Caulaincourt, Napoleon’s last foreign minister.
Descriptions of each man include information beyond their political and social significance. For
example, Savant describes Cambacérès as an exceptionally gifted and experienced politician, but
also as a ridiculous, egotistical freemason.2
Philippe-Joseph-Benjamin Buchez’s Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française,
ou Journal des assemblées nationales, depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1815, published in 1838, provides
additional biographical information on key figures beyond the ministers involved with Malet’s
conspiracy. The source presents details of the participants’ personality traits that go
unmentioned in other works. When explaining the events surrounding the arrest and trial of
Malet and his alleged accomplices, Buchez comments upon each man’s reaction, which ranged
from acceptance, to lament, to pride.
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Completely abandoning a biographical approach, Louis Bergeron’s France Under
Napoleon (1981) provides a detailed account of daily life in Napoleonic France. Relying heavily
on archival documents concerning finances, agriculture, and politics, Bergeron provides a solid
foundation for understanding Malet’s plot in the context of Paris, as well as in France as a whole.
The focus on the daily lives of French citizens illuminates a number of issues with which
Frenchmen were unhappy, particularly constant conscription and ever-increasing taxes.
Bergeron also explains that French peasants saw themselves in Napoleon and expected—at least,
initially—to benefit from the alleged equality of opportunity as the Emperor himself had done.
As Napoleon’s rule continued, however, the common man began to resent the burdens placed
upon him by the conscription and heavy taxes required by Napoleon’s continuous military
campaigns. While many peasants still supported it, some began to feel that the imperial regime
“did not keep the promises which [they] thought it had made.”3 Such disenchantment existed not
only in France’s rural areas, but in the heart of Paris as well. Bergeron argues, in fact, that had
Malet been able to gather civilian support for his plot, he may have succeeded in permanently
toppling Napoleon’s regime.4 Napoleon had known that his constant absences from the capital
were less than ideal. Until he learned of Malet’s plot, however, he had not seriously considered
the gravity of the situation.
After establishing the political and social background of France under Napoleon’s rule, it
is necessary to evaluate various portrayals of General Malet and to discern his true character and
motive for attempting to overthrow the Empire. Many secondary sources that mention the
conspiracy only in a sentence or two, as is generally the case in more recent works, do not
provide any information or background on who the General was or why he had plotted against
Napoleon. Accounts of the conspiracy written during the mid to late nineteenth-century typically
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portray Malet either as an ingenious political dissident or as a madman. More recent accounts
tend to opt for a more objective view, depicting him as a frustrated anti-Bonapartist, rarely
calling his mental health into question.
As one of the few books that deals exclusively with Malet’s conspiracy, Max Billard’s La
Conspiration de Malet (1907) is invaluable. Billard’s narrow focus allows for a more detailed
account of the events of 22 October 1812 than most authors provide. For example, in discussing
La Force, the prison in which Malet and several of his cohorts served part of their sentences,
Billard not only describes the building, but also gives specific information on its location, even
its street address. He also paints an interestingly eccentric portrait of General Malet, a man he
clearly finds psychologically disturbed.
Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire depicts the General, instead, as an enterprising political
dissident set on overthrowing what he considered to be an oppressive regime in order to restore
the true meaning of the Revolution’s ideals to the nation. In the version of Malet’s conspiracy
provided in his book Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le gouvernement et la
personne de Napoléon (1847), Saint-Hilaire argues that the General wanted to rid France of
Napoleon as soon as he seized power as First Consul.5
Specific details can vary, even among those authors who consider Malet an ardent,
though sane, supporter of republican government. In their memoirs, several people portray
Malet as a man who did not care on whom he stepped in his pursuit to overthrow Napoleon. The
depictions of Malet’s alleged accomplices by such authors often exude a sense of sympathy,
describing these men as innocent fools tricked into participating in the plot. During his attempt
to overthrow the imperial regime, Malet successfully deceived several high-ranking military
officials, prompting them to place their troops under his control. The willingness of the common
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National Guardsman to follow the orders issued by their superiors is not surprising. The
readiness with which their superiors followed Malet’s orders without question, however, speaks
to the fragility of Napoleon’s Empire, even among those he considered his most trustworthy
devotees. In his Napoleon: A Biography (1997), Frank McLynn forms the opinion that Malet’s
plot had no particular leader, contradicting the General’s own testimony during his trial.6
McLynn attributes the plot to a wider conspiracy, rather than a small-scale plan hatched by one
man, possibly with the help of several close acquaintances.
Another issue often disputed among those who study Napoleonic France is the Emperor’s
motivation for returning to Paris from Russia ahead of his troops. In addition to military losses
at the hands of Czar Alexander’s army, the Grande Armée faced starvation, blinding
snowstorms, nearly sub-arctic temperatures and devastating Cossack raids. Despite such
horrendous conditions, many historians argue that soldiers remained willing to follow and
support Napoleon. It was only upon his departure that morale sunk to its lowest point.
According to primary sources, including memoirs of advisors and high-ranking military officials
with the Emperor in Russia, Malet’s plot brought to Napoleon’s attention the horrifying fragility
of his Empire. Having realized the weak position his government was in, even in his own capital
city, he decided to leave his troops and return to Paris as quickly as possible. He believed that if
an uprising such as Malet’s could take place in the heart of his Empire, the situation may be even
graver in conquered territories under his control. Primary sources express that he had no choice
but to return to Paris where he could govern more closely, as he was no longer willing to rely
solely on ministers whose actions had called into question both their loyalty and their capability.
Secondary sources contend, on the other hand, that the attempted coup was simply the final straw
for Napoleon in determining his course of action.
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In The Age of Napoleon (1963), J. Christopher Herold illustrates the Emperor’s fear that
regions under his control would revolt when they learned of the catastrophic conditions his army
was facing in Russia. When the news of Malet’s conspiracy reached him in early November, he
could no longer deceive himself into thinking that his dynasty was secure. The fact that a single
man had managed to dupe several top military officials into allowing and participating in the
arrest of some of the highest-ranking political figures without raising any objections alarmed
Napoleon. More importantly, in the Emperor’s opinion, at least, was the fact that not a single
man had looked to his wife, the Empress Marie-Louise, or his son, the King of Rome, to succeed
him, had the news of his death been true. Herold does not discuss Malet’s conspiracy in any
further detail.
Other secondary sources provide more comprehensive information on the ties between
Malet’s attempted overthrow and Napoleon’s departure from Russia. One of the most useful
accounts is that provided by Adam Zamoyski in his Moscow 1812 (2004). The fact that a known
political malcontent had tricked his political and military officials into acting against the Empire
bothered the Emperor the most. Not a single one among them had looked to Napoleon’s son to
succeed him had news of his death been accurate. Zamoyski argues that the Emperor realized he
had to return to his capital in order to secure the future of his regime. Upon making the difficult
decision to abandon his troops, Napoleon remarked to his close advisor, General Armand
Caulaincourt, “with the French . . . it is necessary, as with women, to not embark upon very long
absences. In truth, one never knows what . . . could happen, if one was without news from me
for some time.”7 While Zamoyski does provide more detail on the unfolding of Malet’s
conspiracy than many other recent secondary sources, the discussion remains brief.
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When choosing topics to write about, historians may make their decisions for any number
of reasons. In this particular case, I intend to fill a gap in the literature concerning Napoleonic
France. There had not been a work written specifically to deal with Malet’s plot in a century,
since the publication of Max Billard’s La Conspiration de Malet (1907). Not only is it time for a
historian to bring to light again the most successful conspiracy launched against Napoleon’s
imperial regime, but it is time for the writing of the first such account in English.
Memoirs of Bonaparte’s supporters who witnessed, unwittingly participated in, or lived
through Malet’s plot often insinuate that the General suffered from psychological deficiencies. I
am not convinced. While the fiasco Malet orchestrated at the Te Deum at Notre Dame Cathedral
in 1808 certainly indicates a degree of instability, it is more likely an honest attempt, though
badly timed, and even more poorly executed, by a passionate republican to destroy Napoleon’s
Empire.
Many historians may deem the conspiracy insignificant; yet accounts contemporary to the
events assert otherwise. Fearing that his Empire was on the verge of collapse, Napoleon chose to
return to Paris from Russia only after hearing of the events set into motion by Malet on 22
October 1812. Conversations between Napoleon and the officials with him in Russia clearly
show that the Emperor was deeply distraught over the level of success that the General’s plot
managed. Even more disturbing to him was the meekness with which his most trusted officials
in Paris had “accepted a change of regime, without even giving a thought to the existence of the
empress or the king of Rome.”8 After the events instigated by Malet, it became clear to
Napoleon that running an imperial government required close, personal supervision, especially in
the homeland of liberté, égalité, and fraternité.
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CHAPTER ONE—GENERAL MALET: A BIOGRAPHY
On 22 October 1812, General Claude-François de Malet’s expressive and determined
reddish-brown eyes gazed onto the rainy streets of Paris from a window in Dr. Jacquelin
Dubuisson’s rest home. Nearly sixty years old, the tall, thin, but well-proportioned man with
hair powdered in an outdated style appeared to be a charming and pleasant grandfather. He was,
in fact, a dangerous political malcontent. The city was suffering, he believed, under the
oppressive rule of a tyrant. Despite numerous plebiscites validating Napoleon Bonaparte’s
regime, the current state of affairs, according to some, had not been part of the accepted deal.
The Revolutionary qualities that he had pledged to uphold—liberté, égalité and fraternité—
began disappearing as soon as he took power. Many French citizens believed such decline
foreshadowed society’s return to a system similar to the Bourbon’s Old Regime. While some
expected peace and stability to accompany such a restoration, others saw Napoleon’s
infringement on their freedoms as betrayal. Among the most disillusioned Frenchmen was
General Malet, a man who was no stranger to disappointment.
His father, Jean de Malet, a minor noble, realized early that his family would never enjoy
as much wealth as the higher nobility. Determined to gain recognition and glory instead, he did
so through military endeavors. Over the course of his career, he rose steadily through the ranks,
ultimately becoming regimental captain in the Beauvilliers Cavalry. At the age of sixty, he led
his company to garrison in the Franche-Comté at Dôle. He decided to settle down in the
picturesque and peaceful town and, despite his advanced years, took a young, well-off bourgeois
woman, Gabrielle Fèvre, as his wife and finally began a family. Together, they produced two
sons and a daughter, welcoming their first child, Claude-François, on 28 June 1754.
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Wanting to pursue a military career like his father, this young man enlisted in the first
company of the King's Musketeers on 26 December 1771. Due in large part to his noble status,
he quickly gained admission to the Royal Household Troops, the elite though anachronistic
Musketeers, in which each man immediately received an officer's ranking. Made a lieutenant,
Malet served dutifully for four years until France’s financial difficulties led to the dissolution of
the King’s personal entourage on 15 December 1775. He found himself, now at the age of 21,
unemployed and forced to return to the modest estate of his parents in Dôle. Although other
positions were available to him by virtue of his experience and rank, he had a bitter taste in his
mouth and little interest in pursuing his military career. Malet, back home in the Franche-Comté,
found himself swept up in an increasingly raucous vortex of political debate.
Most members of the nobility and clergy intended to maintain the monarchy, but they did
not desire, or approve of, the absolute monarchy established by Louis XIV. Although both
groups hoped to regain some of the political and social influence they had lost during and since
the Sun King's reign, there had yet to be any serious consideration of instituting a constitution—
such as in England—to limit the king's power. The possibility of transitioning to a constitutional
monarchy remained primarily a topic for discussion among “enlightened” philosophers.
Rebelling against the monarchical loyalties inculcated in his youth, Malet became more and
more interested in these budding proposals for a liberal society and government—and made no
effort to hide his preference. Adolphe Thiers, a historian before becoming one of the most
influential political figures in France during the nineteenth century, attributes Malet’s political
ideology, however unusual for someone of his position in society, to his having read the writings
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Thiers neglected to elaborate on this theory simply explaining that
many men of Malet’s time read the philosophe’s works, though few were so clearly affected.1
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As innovative ideas began to take root in Malet’s mind, he found himself in direct opposition to
his father and younger brother, Claude-Joseph, who remained fervent royalists like most of the
nobles in the Franche-Comté and elsewhere. Nothing in Malet's upbringing explicitly destined
him to be a proponent of liberal political beliefs or, ultimately, of republicanism.2 Perhaps he
saw hope in the new proposals, thinking that with such changes in place, the country would
enjoy more stability, not being subject to the haphazard whims of royalty and the privileged
classes.
Although the next thirteen years brought France increasingly massive debt and
widespread famine in the countryside and led the unwitting nation toward revolution, Malet
enjoyed a peaceful and uneventful life at his childhood home, pursuing aimless leisure-time
activities. With time, his friends and family would come to realize, through Malet’s various
schemes, that he was a more unusual person than they had imagined. In addition to his unique
political views, his romantic decisions also drew criticism. Denise de Balay, the youngest
daughter of Baron Charles-Maximilien-Joseph de Balay and Dame Antoinette-Suzanne de Fabri,
had grown up on her parents’ estate in Arbois, thirty-five miles from Dôle. During her teenage
years, she fell in love with her older neighbor, Claude-François, and expressed to her parents the
desire to marry him. They vehemently refused, primarily on political grounds. Balay, a
steadfast monarchist, would never dream of allowing his daughter to marry such a flagrant
liberal, regardless of his noble status. Resolute to the point of stubbornness and unconcerned
with political dispositions, the young girl decided that if her parents could not respect her wishes,
she would join the nearby Ursuline convent. Because she was only sixteen years old, her parents
initially dismissed both requests as spontaneous whims, characteristic of children who do not yet
know what they want from life. Ultimately, Denise headed to the convent, seemingly
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determined to disobey her parents’ wishes in one way or another: either they would her grant
permission to marry the man she wanted, or she would become a nun. News of Denise’s
decision reached Claude-François, who rushed to the nunnery where he found the young girl
already covered in white veils. He ran to her side despite the sacrosanct ceremony in progress
and asked for her hand in marriage. Having already taken initial vows, she insisted that he wait
one year while she finished her novitiate training. As the year passed, Denise’s parents came to
accept the union, though they remained skeptical. On 9 January 1788, the seventeen-year-old
Denise wedded the thirty-three-year old Malet.
While Malet’s personal life progressed worry-free, France lacked both finances and food,
two problems which the monarchy could no longer afford to ignore. The weak and indecisive
Louis XVI, unable to remedy the situation himself, called together an Assembly of Notables—
high-ranking officials, upper nobility, and clergy—in January 1787 to discuss reforms. Each
proposal by the controller-general, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, met with fierce opposition.
The Notables did not see how his suggestions would help the nation; they simply recognized that
they would diminish their own power and influence. Not making any progress, Louis XVI
replaced Calonne with Étienne Charles Loménie de Brienne, but the change failed to help the
situation. Left with no other recourse, the king called for the Estates-General, an assembly to
which each of France’s three estates—clergy, nobility, and commons—sent representatives. The
cahiers de doléance, lists of grievances and suggested reforms gathered throughout the kingdom,
decried the nobility and clergy’s traditional privileges but did not aim to destroy either social
distinction or the monarchy. Some delegates, calling themselves Patriots, proposed the creation
of a written constitution limiting the king’s power in favor of a representative government.
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While many considered their propositions unnecessarily radical, such liberal ideas began to
permeate the nation.
A year and a half later, the Revolution was underway, hurling the nation down previously
unexplored paths, the end point completely unknown. In response to the fall of the Bastille on
14 July 1789 and to more generalized bursts of nationwide violence, groups of men gathered
together forming militias, known as National Guards, to defend local property and maintain
order. With the creation of this new military came the need for experienced and qualified
officers. Owing to his previous experience and rank as lieutenant, Malet soon found himself
serving as battalion commander of his hometown’s National Guard. Yet his fervent liberalism
placed him in a precarious situation as the majority of the Franche-Comté remained royalist.3
Less than three months after the fall of the Bastille, passions in Paris boiled over again as
continuously rising bread prices prompted widespread hunger and insurrection. On 5 October
1789, a group of over 6,000 people marched the roughly fifteen miles from Paris to the royal
palace at Versailles. While the rabble’s original aim was to obtain bread, its subsequent political
demands were more complex. The dissenters demanded that Louis XVI return to Paris and that
the decrees passed in August by the liberal members of the Estates-General, now calling
themselves the National Assembly—the implementation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen and the abolition of privilege which effectively destroyed the clear divisions among
France’s three estates—become law. Late that night, approximately 20,000 National Guardsmen
under Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, and another unruly mob appeared, making the
same demands as the day’s initial crowd. Only when the royal couple emerged on their balcony
in their nightclothes and promised to meet the demands placed upon them did the day’s
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bloodshed and destruction end. The following afternoon, the mob escorted the royal family and
members of the National Assembly to the capital.
News of the royal family’s forced relocation to Paris led many Franche-Comté
monarchists to consider the king and queen prisoners in their own capital. Remaining ardent
supporters of the monarchy, the troops under Malet’s leadership wanted to march to the city and
restore royal authority. Originally raised during the summer of 1789, the kingdom’s National
Guards now risked defying their initial purpose of maintaining order. Despite his liberal
passions, Malet was willing to concede that France might not yet be ready for true
republicanism, seeing, in the meantime, a compromise in the conception of a constitutional
monarchy.4 Reconciling himself to the idea that such a government, especially if led by a weak
ruler like Louis XVI, could pave the way to a pure republic, Malet latched onto his troops’
demand to journey to Paris.5 An opportune moment for the men to act never presented itself,
however, and the guardsmen remained in Dôle.
Over the months following their impromptu relocation, the National Assembly brought
hope to a violence-torn nation by passing several well-received reforms. In December 1789,
adult males meeting certain tax requirements gained the right to vote, electing members to a
newly established one-house legislature. The king saw all significant political power shift to an
elected assembly: his own authority greatly reduced, with only the right to suspend legislation
for no more than six years—three sessions of the assembly. The new reforms combined with the
one-year anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, la fête de la fédération, dispelled the National
Guard’s desire to storm into Paris and save the royal family. At the festivities, the King
generated a feeling of optimism throughout the nation by proclaiming, “I, King of the French,
swear to employ the power delegated to me in maintaining the constitution decreed by the
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National Assembly and accepted by me.”6 For the present time, a constitutional monarchy under
Louis XVI's rule seemed plausible. Malet believed that such a government would bring his
dreams of a republic one step closer. He continued to hope and long for a full-fledged republic
but acknowledged that France was not yet ready for such a government. In a letter to Minister of
War Louis Marie, Count of Narbonne-Lara on 13 December 1791, Malet explained his thinking:
“I would prefer a Republic, but I am convinced that it would not suit us at this particular time.
We are still experiencing too many effects from the corruption of the old regime, and the
Republic can only exist with and by the virtues that, unfortunately, we do not yet possess and
that only experience can give us.”7
Malet’s political ideology continually put him at odds with royalist sympathizers,
especially in his private life. His father went so far as to disown him, thereby hoping to scare his
son into rejoining the monarchist cause. Not to be left out of the family endeavors, Malet’s
younger brother, Claude-Joseph, tried numerous times to buy his allegiance, offering him large
amounts of money to abandon republican ideals. Malet resolutely defended his political
principles, refusing to sacrifice them for the sake of a more stable financial situation. He and
Denise lived on his meager salary during the initial disorderly years of the Revolution. As he
began to make a name for himself, however, various opportunities and promotions brought more
money to the couple, though they never became wealthy by any means. Malet’s reputation as a
brilliant, and even more important, liberal-minded military commander allowed him to cultivate
numerous relationships among Paris’s revolutionary elite during his sojourns there.
Among his comrades were the Lameth brothers, Counts Charles and Alexandre, who,
having served across the Atlantic for several years during the American Revolution, were eager
to participate in their own country’s transformation. Alexandre briefly served as president of the
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National Assembly in fall 1790. Despite membership in the Jacobin club, Alexandre came to
believe that this group of radical reformers was moving too far too fast and began seeking to
reconcile himself with the royal court, a sentiment which continued to intensify over the
following months. He lashed out at the Jacobin party, especially Maximilien Robespierre, for its
platform of inciting violence and insubordination throughout the country. Charles became
president of the National Assembly less than a year later, serving briefly during the chaotic time
immediately following Louis XVI’s failed attempt to flee France on 20 June 1791. Using his
power as head of the Assembly, he spoke passionately about the possibility of establishing a
constitutional monarchy in France. Given Louis’ recent attempt to flee, Charles acknowledged
the difficulties his proposal would entail but insisted that the attempt was necessary for the
overall good of the nation.
Playing on the mutual desire to see a constitution established for France, Malet carefully
cultivated his relationship with the Lameth brothers, using their military and political
connections to enhance his own standing. On 30 June 1791, Alexandre suggested him for a
position as aide-de-camp and also for promotion to the rank of captain. Within a month, Malet
received the position, though nothing came of the recommendation for captain. Later, in
December 1791, Adjutant General Victor, Prince de Broglie, personally requested Malet’s
transfer to his command. Broglie soon led his troops through Strasbourg, where a significant
republican society had formed with the blessing of the town’s mayor. The group drew to it a
number of well-known political figures, including Malet’s cousin and author of La Marseillaise,
Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle. Malet’s numerous connections within the government and
military hierarchies may have afforded him some benefits, but they were unable to provide a
smooth route for his career to follow.
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Only after a second recommendation for captain by Alexandre de Lameth, accompanied
by support from Prince de Broglie, did Malet receive his long-sought promotion. On 25 March
1792, he saw himself appointed to Captain of the 50th line. The promotion came just in time for
Malet to prove himself: France declared war on Austria less than a month later. Malet
constantly sent letters to his wife, each increasingly excited about the events underway. Not a
single situation confounded him. He had an answer for every question and a plan for handling
every scenario.8 Either he never shared his insights with his superiors or they simply never
listened. A momentous outbreak on 10 August 1792 sealed the fate of France’s royal family,
catapulting the nation toward a republican government at breakneck speed.
What began as calls for the king’s abdication by several hundred Jacobins at the Champ
de Mars quickly became a force of over 20,000 armed Frenchmen intent on storming the
Tuileries palace. Defense of the royal family rested in the hands of less than 3,000 men, Swiss
Guards and National Guards, a group whose loyalty to the monarchy Louis knew was
questionable at best. As the mob grew rowdier, the king realized the situation was spiraling out
of control, prompting him to beg the National Assembly to send help. His plea went
unanswered. Several of his ministers urged him to throw himself upon the mercy of the
Assembly by fleeing to its meeting place at the Manège.
Upon arrival, the king announced that he hoped by being there he would help prevent
bloodshed. Only then did he admit not knowing any other recourse to take than to join them.
Although the royal couple’s position was perilous, their situation was significantly better than
that of the people who had stayed behind at the Tuileries palace. The Swiss troops, having
quickly run out of ammunition, surrendered, but the besiegers had no intention of being merciful.
They destroyed or stole everything in sight and maimed or murdered anyone they encountered,
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whether military or civilian. The carnage was immense, nearly one thousand bodies left to rot in
the August heat. Afraid that such violence might await them if they did not take drastic
measures, the National Assembly ended the power of the monarchy and imprisoned the royal
family. Clearly, there was no longer any hope for a return to the past or for the success of a
constitutional monarchy. Although he had been willing to accept a constitutional monarchy as
an educational tool on the road toward a republic, its abolition had always been his ultimate
desire. The official declaration of France as a Republic on 21 September 1792, he believed,
would end the political discord and hostility, but not many were as pleased or as optimistic.
Refusing to accept the Assembly’s actions, Victor de Broglie tendered his resignation
from the military. His successor, General Alexandre de Beauharnais, provided Malet yet another
useful political connection. The general was a powerful member of the Jacobin party and was
especially active in Strasbourg. As his aide-de-camp, Malet had a firsthand view into this world,
strengthening his already fervent republican opinions. His rapport with the general helped not
only to intensify his political sentiments but also to further his military career. After seven
months of working under Beauharnais, he received two promotions nearly back to back, a
welcome change from the difficulties he experienced during his quest to become captain:
elevation to head of brigade on 16 March 1793 and then to colonel only two months later.
Despite the prosperous and fluid military career that finally seemed to be in the making, Malet’s
past would once again haunt him.
A decree issued on 21 September 1793 removed all former members of the royal
household troops from active duty in France’s military. Preparing for his trip back to Dôle, he
received numerous letters praising his military abilities and dedication to the Revolutionary
cause. Despite the praise as a loyal republican and capable commander, the Committee of Public
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Safety’s recent decree swept Malet out of the military for the second time in his career. Less
than five months after his return to Dôle, the very people dismissed from the military due to their
previous service for the monarchy became the ones the government specifically invited to
reenlist. Malet did so, reporting to Neustadt on 8 January 1794. Only five months later, the need
for troops to face foreign invaders lessened, and the French military found itself with a top-heavy
hierarchy. Yet again, Malet’s brilliant reputation could not save him from another career
interruption. In June 1795, he faced, for a third time, dismissal from the military with only
letters of fulsome praise to show for his service.
Despite his discharge from service, Malet remained in Paris this time rather than return to
Dôle as he had in the past. The Revolution continued along its twisting and turning path. The
Constitution of the Year III became law on 22 August 1795, setting the foundation for a new
government, the Directory, with a bi-cameral legislature, to replace the current Convention. The
Council of Five Hundred, whose members had to be at least thirty years of age, possessed the
right to initiate legislation and the responsibility of electing the government’s executive power,
the five-man Directory. Two hundred and fifty men, married or widowed and over the age of
forty, made up the Council of Ancients and held authority to approve or veto proposals made by
the Five Hundred. On 13 Vendémiaire IV (5 October 1795), right-wing opponents of the
Convention, backed by thousands of National Guardsmen, squared off against the regime,
intending to ensure that its members did not establish a chokehold on the new governing body.
Quickly massing together a defensive force, the Convention freed roughly 1,500 working class
prisoners to serve as protection. Whether currently serving or not, numerous republican military
officials, including Malet, volunteered to help coordinate the defense of the assembly’s gathering
place.9 The unruly and rebellious group approached the palace, outnumbering its defenders
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25,000 to 6,000. Despite their strength of numbers, many of the rebels were unprepared for
battle, expecting little or no resistance from the much smaller force. Having the advantage of
tried and true leadership from the various volunteer officers, the defenders quashed the rebellion.
Although delighted to have participated in the defense of the Convention, and thus having
furthered the republican cause, Malet had also acted out of purely personal motivations. As soon
as the Convention’s victory became clear, he approached General Henri Clarke about the
possibility of readmission to the military. With the general’s backing, the military welcomed
Malet back on 14 April 1796, placing him at Besançon as colonel of the 6th division.10
Successful suppression of the insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire had achieved several things.
Among them were two that Malet had anticipated: advancing those men who represented his
political beliefs and gaining readmission to the military; a third, he had no way of knowing at the
time. The very event in which he was so proud of having participated served not only his own
purposes but also those of an up-and-coming military genius, the man who would soon become
his arch-nemesis: Napoleon Bonaparte.
Malet enjoyed a period of uninterrupted military duty, seeing battle in Piedmont (Italy) as
France expanded its borders. His loyal and competent service earned him promotion to brigadier
general almost three years to the day of his reinstatement in the army. Contentedly serving a
republican government, he was at the high point of his life. On 15 August 1799, France’s Army
of Italy suffered defeat at the Battle of Novi, prompting a thorough reorganization. Malet bore
no responsibility for Novi, but he found himself pushed from the forefront, sent back to garrison
duty in the Franche-Comté. Although several uneventful months passed with little to no action
in his assigned area, the nation was heading toward another turn. A new regime would take hold
on 18 Brumaire VIII (9 November 1799).
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Napoleon Bonaparte had returned to Paris from military endeavors in Egypt on 13
September 1799. Although the capital’s general public hailed him as a victorious war hero,
many Councilors and military men considered him nothing more than an outlaw who had
abandoned his assignment and his men by returning to France without permission. Despite the
conflicting characterizations, the revolutionary cleric abbé Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès approached
Bonaparte about the possibility of overthrowing the Directory, France’s current republican
regime. Willing to participate, though more anxious and power-hungry than Sieyès had desired,
Napoleon began scheming alongside the abbé and Roger Ducos. First and foremost, the trio
needed to ensure that certain high-ranking government officials would back their plan. Joseph
Fouché, the recently appointed Minister of Police, made it clear that he would neither inform the
Convention nor allow his subordinates to put down the plot. Such duplicitous actions had been
and would remain part of the Minister’s ingenious repertoire. He often ignored schemes, even
those that aimed at overthrowing the government, when he felt that their success would benefit
him. As such, "French historians, no matter whether royalist, republican, or Bonapartist—one
and all spit venom as soon as his name comes up for discussion."11
Support for the coup was even easier to gain from the President of the Council of Five
Hundred, as Napoleon’s younger brother, Lucien, held the position. Gaining the cooperation of
the members of this body required more work. They would not only resist relinquishing power
in general but would be even less willing to bestow it upon a man whom many mistrusted and
disliked. While Sieyès knew that he had the support of the majority of the Ancients, he could not
risk the plan’s going awry. To secure the necessary outcome, he, Ducos, and Bonaparte
developed an elaborate story centered on a fictional plot. Upon hearing that Jacobin dissenters
were prepared to “strike their daggers against the representatives of the nation,” the Council of
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Ancients passed two frantic decrees.12 First, both Councils would relocate all future gatherings
to a more secure and defensible meeting place at the palace of Saint-Cloud just outside the
capital. Second, and more important for the conspiring trio, control of the military troops
garrisoned in Paris would be placed in Bonaparte’s hands. The stage was set.
The following day, Napoleon directed his troops as they provided “protection” for the
Convention’s move to Saint-Cloud. By the time the Councilors realized that the supposed
Jacobin plot was a sham, they found themselves surrounded by a force of over 6,000 under the
leadership of a man who they knew was a co-author of their present circumstance. Once settled
in separate meeting rooms, the Five Hundred undertook to swear allegiance to the Constitution,
while the Ancients suggested the appointment of a new Directory. Upon overhearing the
Ancients’ proposal that afternoon, an impatient Napoleon took matters into his own hands. He
burst upon them and began bungling his way through what was arguably the worst speech of his
life. How dare the Councilors oppose him, he cried, “remember that I walk accompanied by the
god of war and the god of luck!”13 Growing confused and flustered, Napoleon retreated to the
order and safety of his troops outside. He had little time to pull himself back together, however,
as an urgent note from Fouché and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord alerted him that the
moment to strike a deathblow to the current regime was now or never. Paris had become aware
of the hostilities harbored toward him by the Directorial government, and several Jacobin
generals were trying to break the loyalty of Bonaparte’s troops outside the palace. Composing
himself as much as possible, he made his way to the Orangerie to try his hand at addressing the
Council of Five Hundred. While the Ancients had damaged his ego, the Five Hundred seemed
determined to damage him physically. Councilors went mad, threw chairs at the intruder and his
guards, and called for their deaths. With everything deviating disastrously from plan, Lucien
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stepped in to salvage his elder brother’s botched efforts. He announced to the troops his version
of the situation in the meeting room: “The majority of the council is being threatened by the
Terror [Jacobins], some even wielding daggers . . . and threatening to outlaw the general who has
been charged with executing the council’s decree. You must expel the rebels from the
Orangerie. Those brigands are no longer the representatives of the people, but of the dagger.”14
After initial hesitation, the soldiers rushed in, causing the Councilors to flee in fear. Finally, the
conspirators could initiate the plan for their new regime. The Ancients, under the direction of
Sieyès and Ducos, announced the establishment of a provisional government headed by the three
conspirators. Soon, Bonaparte proved more ambitious than his fellow plotters had anticipated,
and it became clear that his was the only name that would truly matter in the running of France's
new regime.
Initially, two committees of twenty-five men each replaced the legislative bodies of the
Directory. As the new assemblies began writing yet another new constitution for France, Sieyès,
Ducos and Bonaparte guided the representatives, ensuring their own desired outcome. The
Constitution of the Year VIII, adopted in December 1799, placed executive power in the hands
of three Consuls, Napoleon Bonaparte, Jean-Jacques de Cambacérès and Charles-François
Lebrun, respectively. Theoretically, keeping the system in check were four assemblies that
separately held no power and combined held very little. The First Consul proposed legislation to
the Council of State, a thirty-to-forty member assembly, who then wrote up the bill. Next, the
Tribunate’s one hundred representatives discussed it but did not have the right to vote on the
proposal. The bill then moved to the three hundred men of the Legislature, who voted on it but
had to do so without the benefit of discussion. If the proposal passed both assemblies, it fell to
the sixty members of Senate to ensure its constitutionality. This last council also had the ability
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to publish decrees called senatus-consultes. Although technically only written opinions, these
pronouncements wielded significant power because they had presumably passed through each
level of the consular system. Guaranteeing that First Consul Bonaparte could ultimately have
any legislation enacted that he wanted, despite the apparent system of checks and balances,
Article 42 of the Constitution clearly explained that the regime’s Second and Third Consuls
played merely consultative roles. When presented with legislation, “they [would] sign the
register of these acts to confirm their presence; if they wish, they may record their opinions; after
which the decision of the First Consul suffices.”15 Although the Consular government presented
a republican façade, Bonaparte clearly intended to consolidate all real political power in himself.
One of the first outward signs of Napoleon’s desire to rule alone was a proclamation he
issued to the French people on 15 December 1799, announcing a vote on the proposed
Constitution. It stated that the new system was “based on true principles of representative
government, upon the sacred rights of property, of equality, and of liberty.”16 Two of the three
traditionally accepted gains of the Revolution were now being placed after the principle of
property. Reminiscent of French values under the monarchy, the idea that property would hold
the same—or more—importance as equality and liberty was an insult to Malet’s republicanism.
Napoleon succeeded in using the Constitution to strengthen his own position while preserving a
republican pretense and was clearly its primary author. He had been in power for only a month
but was already hoarding power for himself. While citizens still played a role in the government,
a new electoral system significantly reduced their direct influence. Although they maintained the
right to vote, citizens no longer directly elected representatives to the four assemblies. Instead,
an elaborate system of elections ultimately created a list of men from which the Senate chose the
ones to serve in the Tribunate and Legislature. Bonaparte was drawing not only political power
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to himself but also the intense hatred of Malet. Ever the political activist, he recognized in the
Constitution of the Year VIII a step away from the true republic for which he longed. As
Napoleon consolidated his authority, his republican opponents believed him more and more
dangerous: a man working against the liberties gained during the chaos of the Revolution, a man
intent upon destroying the citizens’ right to participate in government, a man who wanted to
return to the past by making himself France’s supreme ruler.
To keep his officers from gaining too much influence and thereby threatening his regime,
Napoleon made it a point to prevent them from serving in regions where they had a history.
Stationed for two years in Besançon, less than thirty-five miles northeast of Dôle, Malet enjoyed
the close proximity to his hometown. Little did he know that Napoleon was in the process of
ordering his reassignment. The move, which Malet considered a personal attack, was simply a
matter of policy to the First Consul. On 9 August 1801, he received the order to relocate to the
9th territorial division in Montpellier, nearly 345 miles away, on the Mediterranean coast of
France. As soon as Malet arrived at this new post Bonaparte moved him again, this time to
Bordeaux in the southwest with the 11th division. The distance from home, roughly 455 miles,
and the cost of relocating twice greatly annoyed Malet. From this point on, his fellow officers
and friends begin describing him as a completely different person, cold, bitter, and openly
hostile.
Although his political opinions often put him at odds with the regime in power, Malet had
served loyally regardless of whose orders he received. After his move to Bordeaux, he seemed
to go out of his way to find, or make, trouble. His fierce republicanism put him into constant
conflict with the town’s officials and sundered within eight months any of his helpful ties in the
city. Although his republican ideals included denunciation of the privileges and elevated status
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enjoyed by the nobility prior to 1789, he acted as if he were an exception. Whether he expected
people to honor his requests—or more accurately, his demands—because of his noble birth or
simply because of his current military status is unclear. Regardless of the specific cause, Malet's
apparent expectation that his desires be satisfied without question infringed upon the idea of
equality introduced by the Revolution which he so passionately claimed to follow.17 The
constant hostilities prompted Malet to insist upon a transfer. On 24 April 1802, he reported to a
new post in nearby Périgueux. Not yet satisfied, he immediately demanded, and received, a twomonth leave of absence at full pay.
Napoleon proved dissatisfied with his own current position, seeking to draw more
political power to himself, much to the chagrin of his partners from 18 Brumaire, Sieyès and
Ducos. Given the Revolution's violent aversion to monarchical rule—or to any form of
government under a single person—he took gradual, though obvious, steps in that direction. The
Peace of Amiens, signed on 25 March 1802 by France and the United Kingdom, brought muchneeded relief to the people of both nations and to mention Europe as a whole, which had endured
a decade of nearly non-stop warfare. In addition to inaugurating peace between the two
countries, the treaty announced the return of prisoners and hostages taken by both sides and
dictated that the United Kingdom return colonies previously belonging to nations involved in the
peace—Britain maintained only Trinidad and Ceylon. France was to evacuate its positions in
Naples and the Roman states, though the nation did gain acknowledgement of its natural
boundaries, along the Alps and the Rhine River. For French citizens, the treaty also brought as a
bonus lower taxes and conscription demands. With his reputation soaring to an all-time high,
Napoleon knew the time to strengthen his hold on power had come. Taking advantage of the
Senators’ offer in summer 1802 to extend his term as Consul to ten years, he cleverly suggested a
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plebiscite asking the nation whether he should serve in this position for life. Although they
accepted the idea, many politicians were alarmed, considering “the impression of the revolution .
. . still too fresh and this transition too abrupt.”18 The French people as a whole were less
concerned with Napoleon’s attempt to retain all political power for himself. In him they saw
their salvation from war and the constant chaos of the Revolution. While the voting process was
free from direct tampering, voters certainly felt pressured to approve the proposed change. The
typical adult male might have feared retaliation for casting a no vote, as they were required to
sign their names in a register before voting. Not wanting to leave room for doubt, some military
officials threatened their men. One general, gathering his men outside the voting center, stated
blatantly: “You are free to hold your own opinion; nevertheless, I must warn you that the first
man not to vote for the Consulate for life will be shot in front of the regiment.”19 The Senate
ratified the Constitution of the Year X, including Napoleon's new title, before knowing the vote's
outcome. The Senators' premature action ultimately corresponded to the desires of French
citizens, who voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Life Consulate, 3,568,855 in favor, a mere
8,374 opposed, including Malet. With the new Constitution and a resounding victory granted to
him by the people, Napoleon had successfully gathered all political power to himself, while
leaving to the other Consuls and Senators just enough to maintain a republican façade.
The sham of a republic did not fool everyone. Malet saw France returning to the past as
citizens voted away the gains of the revolution by placing all authority in the hands of one man.
Skeptical of Napoleon’s objectives since 18 Brumaire, Malet grew incensed as the Consul
gathered power unto himself. Upon hearing the news of the change in term as Consul, he
immediately swore a vehement hatred of the leader, a sentiment that proved lifelong.20 Initially,
he took no direct action and instead wrapped himself in his career, serving faithfully and
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admirably. Stationed far from any especially republican crowds, Malet tired of the Napoleonic
acolytes surrounding him. He demanded transfer to Angoulême, a city more overtly republican.
Upon arrival, he began meeting with republicans and plotting alongside them. Opting to avoid
violent forms of protest, Malet simply sent letters to various officials revealing his frustrations.
He sent one such report, for example, to Minister of War Louis-Alexandre Berthier on 19
fructidor XI (6 September 1803) denouncing émigrés and expressing his disgust with several
ministers.21 Eventually increasing the gravity of his actions, he refused to allow his men to serve
at a number of political functions within the city. No truly disciplinary repercussions followed
these spiteful acts because he coupled them with letters sent directly to Napoleon reminding the
First Consul of the invaluable services he had performed in his name. Expecting his respectable
military career to counteract any minor disturbances he created, Malet feared no punitive action.
Despite the general’s disobedience, Prefect of Charente Felix Bonnaire had no objection to
Malet’s maintaining his position in the military, but he preferred that he do it somewhere else.
Demanding the troublemaker’s transfer to the Vendée, he wrote that “the most important thing
for this region is that he has a change of residence.”22 Although never reaching the point of
violence, Malet’s increasingly mischievous behavior had labeled him a political malcontent.
Napoleon’s hold on power depended greatly on loyalty, a commodity he was willing to
purchase when needed. Despite the Revolution’s promise of equality, he knew that people
enjoyed striving to rise above others. Running the risk of criticism for stepping back to practices
of the Old Regime, he proposed the creation of the Legion of Honor in spring 1802. Admission
depended on ability, talent, and faithful service, whether military or civilian. The suggestion
faced significant disapproval on the ground that the organization would serve no purpose other
than distributing useless honorific trinkets and promoting inequality. To such claims, Napoleon
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retorted, “it is by baubles alone that men are led.”23 Pure and complete equality was not
something that the Consul believed Frenchmen truly wanted. He saw it as something “they
would gladly renounce . . . if everyone could entertain the hope of rising to the top.”24 The
Legion would have five levels, each providing a different amount of prestige and money. Only
one man held the highest rank, that of Grand Chancellor, at any given time. At the next level
were Grand Officers, who received an annual salary of 5,000 francs, followed by Commandants,
earning 2,000 francs, Officers, 1,000 francs, and Legionnaires, 250 francs.25 Although the
Legion of Honor was open to civilians, an overwhelming majority of its members were military
men. Among the roughly 4,000 civilians—compared to nearly 32,000 soldiers—welcomed into
the fold between 1802 and 1814, most of them were high-ranking government officials.
Bonaparte, realizing the power behind man’s desire for honor and recognition, used the Legion
not only to reward the faithful but also to buy the loyalty of the unfaithful.
Had the Legion of Honor existed earlier, Malet’s initial years of loyalty to the Revolution
might well have earned him admission. Now, not his military service but his open hostility
caught Napoleon’s attention. On 12 December 1803, in a blatant effort to purchase Malet’s
devotion to the Consulate, the Legion welcomed him with the rank of Commander. He promptly
responded in a letter humbly acknowledging the distinction and declaring his unshakable “love
of country and liberty.”26 Bonaparte would learn soon enough that he had merely succeeded in
renting, not buying, Malet’s loyalty.
In May 1804, the Senate, under obvious pressure, suggested that Napoleon take the title
of Emperor, rendering the regime hereditary and supposedly more stable. Although the
suggestion disheartened some members, only one Senator actively spoke against the proposal
and voted no. On 18 May, the Senators approved the transition. Still wanting to preserve the
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façade of a republican government, Napoleon ordered a plebiscite, stating that he would not
accept the position if it were not the will of the people. Six months later, French citizens voted
whether they supported his accession to Emperor, a hereditary position that would pass, if he had
no legitimate children of his own, to a brother, Joseph or Louis Bonaparte. The result,
announced on 6 November 1804, was a victory for Napoleon: 3,572,329 to 2,569. Such an
outcome was—and is—a “virtual statistical impossibility,” implying that 99.9993 percent of
Frenchmen voted in favor of the proposition.27 Whether or not someone distorted the numbers,
Napoleon’s coronation took place on 2 December 1804 at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.
Perhaps hoping that a certain level of camaraderie existed between them, Malet wrote
Napoleon a short letter after his coronation implying warm feelings. He did, however, try to
convince the Emperor to avoid a tyrannical reign, beseeching him not to turn his back on the
people who had granted this new station: “use all the power that your magisterial title grants you
to ensure that this new form of government functions to save the nation from the incapacity or
tyranny of your successors, and that, having ceded to you some of our precious liberty, we will
not one day be reproached by our children for having ceded theirs.”28 While the tone of the letter
was surprisingly positive and hopeful, Malet had in no way turned from his republican
principles. His passive resistance and insubordinate behavior in Angoulême had brought him
unfavorable attention several years ago. Surely, he did not actually expect Napoleon to heed his
advice on how to run the nation.
After the imperial coronation, Malet’s campaign of libel against local officials
intensified, as he wrote more and more letters denouncing simple civil servants and senators. By
the end of 1805, he was serving with the Army of Italy in Rome. Even out of the country his
attitude did not change and so drew him into incessant conflict with superior officers and
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government officials. Tired of dealing with the complaints about Malet, Minister of War
Alexandre Berthier took decisive steps. Not trusting insubordination to be sufficient charge to
dismiss him from military service, Berthier concocted additional allegations. He charged Malet
with showing favoritism to French soldiers after a profitable confiscation of goods, thereby
creating hostility and insurrection among the accompanying Roman militia. The indictment was
serious enough that a board of inquiry immediately summoned him to Paris to answer for his
conduct.
Malet and Denise moved to the capital city on 15 July 1807, taking up residency at no 75,
rue des Saints-Pères. During the investigation, which lasted nearly a year, he continued to
receive the same salary as when on active duty. Aside from the humiliation of having his life
scrutinized for transgressions he had not committed, the respite seemed nothing more than a paid
vacation. With the exception of periodically appearing before the board’s judges to defend
himself, Malet had nothing to do. Taking advantage of his free time, he fell in with an
underground group of liberal activists. The club comprised mostly well-off members of society,
including doctors and high-ranking military and political officials. Upon Malet’s admission to
the group, he learned of a plot formulated by General Joseph Servan de Gerbey, briefly Minister
of War in 1792, to overthrow Napoleon’s regime. Here was an idea that Malet could support.
Servan proposed replacing the Imperial regime with a provisional government, though he
planned to work out its specific details only as the need arose. If once in power the new regime
found itself unable to continue, it would extend an invitation to the Bourbon family, offering to
allow their return to the monarchy. Servan was not willing, however, to sacrifice the gains
achieved by the French Revolution. The Bourbons would only be welcome under the conditions
of the Constitution of 1791—real authority resting in a unicameral legislature, with the king
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maintaining solely the right to postpone legislation—with some modifications.29 Before he
could risk putting his plan into motion, he needed to ensure that the plot had support from key
figures within the city. Servan won several senators to his cause by promising them positions in
the provisional government which would replace the Imperial setup they despised. They had
lacked any true political power since Bonaparte’s takeover on 18 Brumaire: he simply kept the
Senate around to ensure that his regime continued to appear republican, at least on the surface.
Should Servan succeed in reinstituting the Constitution of 1791, the senators would enjoy more
authority than they currently possessed. Even more important, Servan had to ensure Minister of
Police Fouché’s allegiance, a task deemed easy enough given his passivity on 18 Brumaire.
Fouché was the type of man who served whoever or whatever regime happened to be in power at
the time, looking out only for himself. His position in the government made him privy to a
limitless information about criminals, general malcontents, and political dissidents. His men
constantly reported news of subversive endeavors in the making. Some they thwarted in infancy,
some they fabricated to justify the arrest of otherwise innocent citizens, and some they simply let
happen. Fouché had no intention of interfering in Servan’s plan, should he ever manage to get it
off the ground. As in the past, he was content to serve the victor of the situation. Should
Servan's plan succeed, Fouché's would offer his services to the new regime. Should it fail, he
would devotedly perform the duties of his office and arrest the conspirators. He seemed to have
no true loyalty. In fact, he once stated, "I don’t care for any particular form of government over
another. All that means nothing . . .."30 Napoleon was aware of Fouché's deceitful nature, but he
valued his services because no one else had his skill at penetrating every social organ. The
Emperor appreciated the minister's results but suspected his motives. In order to keep Fouché in
check, Napoleon maintained two distinct police forces, one under Fouché and one under Prefect
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of Police Louis-Nicolas Dubois. To check the possibility of independent action from Fouché, he
increased the number of police under Dubois’s supervision.
The Emperor failed to consider the precarious position in which he left his nation when
on military campaign. To savvy politicians, however, the dangerous circumstances were clear.
It was bad enough that the Emperor was placing himself in danger by accompanying the military
to battle, but the fact that he left behind no direct heir complicated the situation. While the same
documents which made him Emperor also stipulated that one of his brothers, either Joseph or
Louis, would succeed him if he had no legitimate children of his own, this prospect was hardly
reassuring. If death found Napoleon on the battlefield, his nation would once again find itself
catapulted into civil chaos. Republicans and royalists would clash, rekindling the Revolutionary
fire. Here was precisely the situation that General Servan dreamed of every night. In early 1807
it seemed as if his dreams might come true.
The joint force of Prussia and Russia that Napoleon faced on 7 February 1807 in the town
of Eylau, less than thirty miles south of Königsberg, easily outnumbered his own troops. His
infantry was dwarfed 67,000 to 45,000, and his artillery pieces fell short 260 to 200. Casualties
on the first day of fighting totaled roughly 4,000. The number of wounded quickly became the
number of dead as most of the injured men, exposed to the excruciatingly cold temperature and
heavy snowfall, did not survive the night. The second day of battle saw blinding blizzard
conditions that rendered the bit of light provided by daybreak virtually useless. As the Russians
began making inroads on the French lines, Napoleon ordered a corps under Marshal Pierre
Augereau to contain the Russian left flank. Delusional with fever and barely able to stand,
Augereau was hardly in prime commanding condition. Growing increasingly disoriented as he
crossed the marshy, pond-laden terrain, he unwittingly led his soldiers straight into the center of
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the Russian artillery line. With no difficulty or hesitation, the Russian gunners obliterated the
Frenchmen. Of the nearly 15,000 soldiers who had obediently and confidently followed
Augereau on the battlefield, only 2,000 would live to see another day.
While the annihilation of this corps dealt a devastating blow to French numbers and
morale, the Russians nearly struck one even more catastrophic blow that could have easily
destroyed any hope for the survival of Napoleon’s Empire. As the Emperor watched the battle
unfold from a bell tower within Eylau, nearly 6,000 Russian troops headed straight for him. His
own troops were all on the battlefield, leaving him with only his personal escort for protection.
If the Russians could manage to capture—though they were more likely to kill—the illustrious
Napoleon Bonaparte, not only would the battle be over but so would his reign. His guards would
rather die than let that happen. And die they did. The Russians mercilessly mowed down the
French, who sacrificed themselves as human shields. Their heroic efforts succeeded in slowing
the enemy long enough to allow the arrival of two French battalions which repelled the attack
completely.
As streams of blood oozed across the frozen battlefield, Napoleon knew that he faced a
desperate problem. The loss of life was devastating, though he could hide that fact easily
enough. To the nation, rather than reporting the real figure estimated around 25,000, he admitted
suffering fewer than 8,000 dead and wounded, a baldfaced lie when considering that Augereau’s
corps alone lost nearly 13,000. On the other hand, his troops had experienced the fighting for
themselves and knew the truth. Haunted by a battle deemed a victory only because they
survived, their morale was crashing, further aggravated by rough terrain, bad weather and hostile
peasantry in the countryside. They asked themselves whether they would ever see France again.

33

Back in Paris, General Servan and his supporters, knowing more accurate details of the
battle than the general public, saw their chance of acting against the Imperial regime. They
began considering how the provisional government they intended to create would function. They
discussed how the regime would work, who would have what positions, and how they would
handle various hypothetical scenarios. By the time they managed to work the details out to
everyone’s liking, the opportune moment to act had passed. News of Napoleon’s decisive
victory at the Battle of Friedland on 14 June 1807 had reached Paris. If Servan tried to put his
plan into action, he would have no chance of success. Discouraged, he tried to assure his
followers that another opportunity would arise. Although he may have been right, he would not
live long enough to make use of it.
Servan died in Paris on 10 May 1808 at the age of sixty-seven. To some, the hopes of
overthrowing Napoleon’s regime passed along with him. Others saw their aspirations continuing
in Malet, who had commenced conspiring even before Servan’s death. Thirteen men, each as
eccentric as their leader, initially united with the general in his attempt to overthrow Napoleon's
empire. Several of them, sharing Malet's political proclivities, had held positions in France's
previous republican governments. Pierre-Alexandre Lemare, former president of the
administrative commission in the Jura, found himself swept out of office on 18 Brumaire,
instantly instilling in him a deep hatred of the nation's new leader. Antoine-François Ève, called
Demaillot, and Blanchet represented Robespierre's Jacobin club, while Jean-François Ricord, a
lawyer and poet, had served in the Convention. Other politically minded men, Gariot, Rigomer
Bazin and Liébaud, previously held positions in various local governments and administrations
but lacked strong ties to any specific Revolutionary regime. Providing the group with some of
their most important connections was former legislator Florent-Guyot, who had good rapport

34

with a number of Senators. The plot drew men from not only political spheres, but other careers
as well. Baude, an ex-commissioner of police, and Malet’s own former aide de camp, Jacob
Poilpré, supported the general’s conspiratorial efforts. Another schemer was Philippe Corneille,
a “gentle dreamer [who was] hardly dangerous.”31 He had previously served in the Royal Army
but preferred spending his time writing both poetry and prose. The group’s final two members
came from the medical profession, Doctors Gindre and Saiffert. Once assembled, the eclectic
dissidents began meeting on the rue Bourg-l'Abbé in the 3e arrondissement to plot the Emperor's
downfall.
Although the basis was similar to that of Servan's, Malet intended to amend the plan's
ultimate goal. After all, if it failed, Malet would bear the harshest punishment. He could not risk
leaving his wife and son without provision or subject himself to imprisonment or execution for a
plan with which he was not completely satisfied. Servan had been content with returning the
Bourbons to the throne under a constitutional monarchy, but Malet had another idea. Rather than
reinstating any previous constitution, he proposed a new regime which he would call—
dangerously enough—the Dictatorship.
Bonaparte had turned his military focus to Spain in spring 1808, intending to depose
Charles IV and install his own elder brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. He set out with his
troops from Paris on 2 April, heading to Bayonne, nearly 480 miles southwest, near the Spanish
border. Despite being closer to the capital than during previous campaigns, the Emperor’s
attempts at communication were no easier—there were no semaphore stations established toward
the Pyrenees, and if Paris needed to get word to its leader, or vice versa, the only option was
courier. The time required by such communication worked perfectly for Malet’s plot. Once

35

Napoleon arrived in Bayonne, he could hope for no faster communication with his capital than
two days in each direction.
Four days was more than plenty, Malet believed. After all, his plan was no more
elaborate than the one that had brought Napoleon to power in the first place. His fellow
conspirators agreed, and they launched phase two. Philippe Corneille, an author of both poetry
and prose, assumed that his writing experience would allow him to create believable political
documents which would prove the legality of the Dictatorship. Although the idea seemed good
at the time, the assumption was wrong. In fact, his ineptitude proved more of a hindrance than a
help.
The first document, considered a necessity by all of the conspirators, was a forged
senatus-consulte declaring Napoleon an outlaw and announcing the framework for a new
government. The Dictatorship would consist of nine men, Malet included, and would have the
task of ruling France while also drafting a new constitution on which the people would vote after
its completion.32 Bazin and Corneille, charged with the task of creating the faux Senatorial
decree, ultimately produced a mediocre and problematic text. They faced three decisions,
muddling them all. First, the name chosen for the proposed government was a problem. Bazin
and Corneille understood that using the word "dictatorship" in their senatus-consulte would
alarm the printer, who then might alert authorities. Wanting to avoid use of the term, they opted
to have it spelled "diotatorship."33 With the copies in hand, they planned to erase the connection
in the "o," making it resemble a "c." Second, they dated the document 20 April 1808, though
Malet did not intend to execute the plot until late May. If anyone asked about the discrepancy,
they planned to explain that the Senate had debated the idea of ending Napoleon's regime in
secret, publishing the document but choosing not to circulate it until later. Third, rather than
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concluding with a list of approving senator's names, they simply left "Signatures to Follow,"
thereby casting doubt on the authenticity of the senatus-consulte, the very document intended to
legitimize the Dictatorship.34
In addition to the senatorial decree, Bazin and Corneille produced three more
proclamations to implement should they succeed in overthrowing the imperial regime. One,
simply titled “Decree of 29 May 1808,” outlined the Dictatorship's initial twelve orders of
business. The two opening articles addressed the military, announcing the immediate withdrawal
of French troops from foreign lands, the abolition of conscription, and an amnesty for anyone
who had dodged the draft or deserted. Malet and his conspirators considered recalling French
forces a necessary step to ensure lasting peace under the supervision of the new government.
Previous regimes had come and gone, all the time struggling with the challenge of either
maintaining war or ending hostilities on satisfactory grounds. Malet expected the withdrawal of
troops to appease not only France’s European opponents but also French citizens, helping to
ensure their loyalty to the Dictatorship and the government that would eventually take its place.
The article promising both an end to obligatory military service and a general reprieve for those
who had eluded it served a similar purpose. Several other clauses declared the abolition of the
death penalty except, ironically, for cases of rebellion, and extended an official pardon to anyone
exiled, imprisoned, or executed for political beliefs. A final stipulation placed the nation’s
military under Malet’s control.35
If the Dictatorship came to fruition, the general's new position would bring with it the
responsibility for providing Parisian troops with their daily commands. Malet's first decree,
dated 30 May 1808, would reorder the organization of current officers, ensuring that the men
holding those positions were loyal to him. He declared that commands from anyone not
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specified in that group or in future “Orders of the Day” null and void and also banned the
wearing of any imperial decorations, including the ones bestowed upon members of the Legion
of Honor. Troops with such commendations would receive medals deemed appropriate by the
Dictatorship at a future date, assuming the regime proved lasting.36
The publication of the senatus-consulte and the two subsequent decrees would only
inform government and military officials currently stationed in Paris about the demise of
Napoleon's empire. To spread the word among the general public and French troops abroad,
Malet ordered the printing of 12,000 proclamations titled “Dictatorship,” remarkable considering
the group’s simultaneous effort to avoid using that very term. The document assumed that
French citizens had tired of warfare and longed to regain the fullness of the liberties they had
won during the French Revolution. Should his plot succeed, Malet wanted to take an early
opportunity to assure Frenchmen that tyranny would not pervade the new government as it had
with Napoleon’s rise to power. The final paragraph of the first section promised that the
members of the Dictatorship had only France’s best interest in mind: “Citizens and soldiers, in
attacking tyranny, we took pride in aspiring to true glory, that of creating in France a liberal
administration. This result obtained, we will immediately rejoin your ranks. The blessings of
happy citizens are the only goal of our ambition, the sole treasure with which we want to enrich
ourselves.”37 To the soldiers, Malet wrote that they had not been “Bonaparte’s troops,” that such
possession was impossible.38 They owed the Emperor nothing, for their only true loyalty had to
lie with France and the wishes of her people. The general promised that his provisional
government would be careful to uphold the liberties of the French people. That is, if he and his
co-conspirators were successful.
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While some of the group’s ideas may seem eccentric, none was more so than a suggestion
made by Lemare concerning their weapon of choice. To avoid drawing attention by purchasing
weapons, several of the plotters offered the use of guns already in their possession. Something
quieter, Lemare argued, something more befitting the situation. A dagger, he explained “is the
proper weapon of conspirators, a clever choice that can serve two purposes. If need be we can
use it against ourselves to prevent being taken alive by the hands of the tyrant or his devotees.”39
The group accepted the proposal, putting him in charge of acquiring enough knives to arm not
only themselves but also those they expected to draw to their cause along the way. Now the
question became how to obtain the desired 1,200 daggers without raising suspicions. Wandering
through Paris, Lemare purchased the handles from one shop and the blades from another. With
weapons acquired, the conspirators turned their attention to last minute details.
Four days before the date set for the overthrow, the group decided to confide in General
Pierre Guillet and General Guillaume for additional help while the plot unfolded. After Malet
read aloud the false senatus-consulte, Guillaume asked question after question about nearly
every aspect of the plan. The level of anxiety among the conspirators increased with each
additional inquiry. Perhaps his questions arose from genuine curiosity and interest, or perhaps
they portended a disastrous ending. As the group adjourned for the night, Malet suddenly
declared that Minister of Police Fouché had somehow learned of their plan and that, to ensure
their safety, they should postpone taking any action. Although Fouché had, in fact, heard rumors
of a republican plot circulating for several weeks, it is unlikely that Malet knew. He intended his
exclamation to startle the two newcomers into not participating, at which point the original
conspirators could reschedule their plans.
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As the baffled men headed home from the meeting, Guillaume and Demaillot discussed
the night’s events, each growing increasingly hostile toward the other. Finally, Demaillot could
take no more and launched into a screaming fit, blaming Guillaume for the plan’s sudden
reversal. Unfortunately for the two, the shouting match took place just outside of the PalaisRoyal where General Lemoyne happened to be within earshot. Seeking readmission to active
duty—the military had forced him to retire against his will in 1794 at the age of fifty-three—he
saw his opportunity, knowing that his assistance in thwarting a conspiracy would not go
unrewarded. He immediately made his way to Dubois’s prefecture of police, in the 4e
arrondissement, to report what he had heard: that Guillaume and Demaillot were busy plotting
against the imperial regime. Although the information was inaccurate, Prefect Dubois acted
quickly, unlike his counterpart, Fouché, who had long known that a conspiracy was brewing but
had taken no action—perhaps waiting for more details, but more likely, as in the past, never
having any intention of interfering. Within a week, Dubois ordered the arrest of the two alleged
schemers.
Despite remaining silent in accordance with Malet’s final words at the last meeting—
though the documents that they had spent so much time on expired in the meantime—the
conspirators were about to face trouble. On the morning of 8 June 1808, Demaillot and
Guillaume each woke to a knock on his door. Greeting them were several of Dubois’s men
waiting to take them into custody. After escorting them to separate interrogation rooms at the
prefecture, Inspector Veyrat, one of Dubois’s best men, grilled them about the details of the
conspiracy. The meeting was not the first for Demaillot and the inspector. Prior to joining the
police, Veyrat had made a living counterfeiting, a way of life cut short when Demaillot testified
against him. Facing charges of his own, however, Demaillot remained silent during questioning.
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Guillaume, on the other hand, crumpled under the pressure. During his first round of
interrogation, he rambled on and on, implicating the other prisoner as the mastermind behind the
conspiracy but only hinting at Malet’s involvement. Having attended only one of the plotters’
meetings, he knew little of the actual plan. Not satisfied with the information they had obtained
thus far and making no progress with Demaillot, the police questioned Guillaume again later that
same day. This time he denounced every person whose name he could remember, though it was
hardly a complete list: Corneille, Guillet, and Gariot. With this information, Dubois and his
men began searching for the rest of the plotters.
As soon as he learned of the arrests, Malet fled his home to seek safety elsewhere. After
spending the night at the Hôtel d’Orient in the 7e arrondissement, he rushed to his next
hideout—clearly an illogical choice—the house of fellow conspirator Poilpré. Wanting to let
Denise know that her husband was safe, Poilpré headed to her home, though his friendly deed
severely compromised his own security, not to mention that of Malet. Dubois’s police, knowing
the former soldier’s connection to Malet, waited for him outside the general’s residence and took
him into custody when he arrived. His arrest quickly led to that of Malet. Not at all denying
involvement in the conspiracy, the general, even before the interrogation began, divulged every
detail of the plot that the police could possibly have wanted, though he added his own twist.
Rather than admit that he was the author of the plot, he denounced Florent-Guyot and
Jacquemont as the ringleaders.40 No longer confident that he would receive leniency from
Bonaparte, he sought to hide behind the names of two well-known and influential politicians. By
mid-July, Dubois’s men had arrested each conspirator.41 Napoleon’s regime seemed safe.
When Napoleon received Dubois’s first account of the thwarted takeover, he replied
calmly that he wanted the “shady business” stopped quickly and quietly.42 In each of his
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subsequent reports, the prefect passionately insisted that the men under arrest posed a real threat
to the Empire. He portrayed them as serious insurgents who would stop at nothing to destroy the
Imperial regime as long as they freely roamed the nation. In his own daily reports to the
Emperor, however, Minister of Police Fouché consistently downplayed the danger of the
conspiracy, referring to the interrogations still underway as “conversations without real value.”43
In response to Fouché, Napoleon explained that he knew of at least one earlier conspiracy in
which Malet, the “wicked subject [and] cowardly thief,” had involved himself.44 Although not
convinced that the conspirators posed as serious a threat as Dubois depicted, Napoleon
eventually wrote to Fouché telling him that he did not expect, nor approve of, the discrepancies
between the two men’s accounts. Growing angry at the determination of the minister of police to
disregard the seriousness of the situation, Napoleon wrote to Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès on 17
July, “Fouché is spoiled, favoring crackpots whom he hopes to use to his own advantage and
wanting nothing more than to discourage those people who anticipate deadly and extraordinary
events.”45 Although annoyed at him, the Emperor knew of no other man as qualified to lead the
Ministry of Police as Fouché and ultimately took no punitive measures against him. Napoleon
had a history of successfully employing the very people who opposed him, even if they did so
violently. While he recognized Fouché as an extremely talented official, he saw no such value in
General Malet. The Emperor’s wrath fell upon Malet and his co-conspirators, and by mid-July
they found themselves prisoners of state incarcerated in Paris at the La Force prison in the 4e
arrondissement.
Imprisonment only heightened Malet’s hatred of Napoleon and his allegedly tyrannical
regime. Similarly, his stunt in June 1808 had increased, at least temporarily, the Emperor’s
interest in him. Napoleon had his police keep him up to date on the conspirator’s actions,

42

wanting to know who his visitors were and to whom he spoke within the prison. Writing himself
to Napoleon on 23 October 1808, Malet sought to justify the plot he had hatched over the spring.
His actions, he argued, stemmed from a true desire to protect the long-term prosperity of France,
something he argued the current Imperial regime endangered. “What will happen to us if we
lose our Emperor?” he asked.46 As long as Napoleon continued to insist upon being at the head
of his troops amid the perils of war, his government was tragically fragile. The Emperor had no
obvious reaction to Malet’s explanation, but surely he recognized the validity of the general’s
argument. Whereas he had pardoned, and subsequently used to his own advantage, numerous
plotters and malcontents in the past, he believed that the services Malet could offer were not
worth the effort.47 Bribery would not work on the general, as Napoleon had discovered upon
admitting him to the Legion of Honor. The only chance of preventing future conspiracies by the
dissatisfied Malet was to lock him in prison indefinitely. Or so the Emperor thought.
Prison was not enough to quell Malet’s insubordination. On 29 June 1809, a Te Deum
celebrating the capture of Vienna took place in Notre Dame. At La Force, just under a mile from
the cathedral, the general was aware of the event and knew that all important officials would be
in attendance. Although his means remain unknown, Malet managed to escape from his cell
unnoticed, making his way toward Notre Dame, where he hid among the crowd. After the
ceremony, the troops were the first to leave. As they filed out, leaving the majority of politicians
and high-ranking military officers inside, he slammed the main doors, momentarily trapping
them. Climbing to the highest point possible outside the building, he began shouting:
“Bonaparte is dead! Down with Corsicans! Down with the police! Long live liberty!”48
Following his already ludicrous claims, he announced an end to the Empire and the creation of a
republic. He rattled off a list of names and their new positions within the government. His
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outburst was a fast-paced version of the plot which had led to his arrest the previous year. The
outcome was only slightly different this time. He faced not only recapture but also the hysterical
laughter of his fellow soldiers.
Rather than return him to La Force, which was obviously not a strict enough regime to
hold him, the police sent him to the prison of Saint-Pélagie in the 5e arrondissement. Only two
months after his arrival, he wrote to Fouché requesting release far from Paris, swearing on his
honor “not to return there until His Majesty believes it proper.”49 How he justified such a
request a mere two months after escaping from prison and attempting again to overthrow the
Imperial regime is a mystery. Regardless of his rationalization, the request went unanswered.
Undeterred, he followed up with a similar letter to Police Chief Jean Marie Savary, Duke of
Rovigo, on 9 October. Again, he received only silence in response. Perhaps realizing the
irrationality behind his request, he altered his appeal in January 1810. Rather than plead for
freedom, which he now knew better than to expect, he asked Prefect Dubois and the warden of
Saint-Pélagie about the possibility of a transfer to the rest home of Doctor Jacquelin Dubuisson
at no 333, rue du Faubourg-Saint-Antoine in eastern Paris. He claimed he suffered from an
illness contracted at La Force and looked forward to a healthier, more comfortable environment
where he could continue serving his sentence “until the moment that the Emperor deigns to
extend his justice” to him.50 On 12 January, Malet finally received a response to his constant
supplications for transfer: “Accepted, however, he remains under surveillance.”51 The judgment
behind moving Malet to a less scrutinizing location is questionable, as he had already escaped
from one of Paris’s most notorious prisons. Perhaps Prefect Dubois hoped that while the general
had most likely not disavowed his republican beliefs, he could buy his good behavior by granting
the wish to relocate. Attempts to purchase loyalty from malcontents had worked in the past, but
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surely Dubois realized that such efforts had never had any success with Malet. Whatever the
reasoning had been, the Prefect would ultimately realize his mistake.
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CHAPTER TWO—HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS IN NAPOLEONIC FRANCE
Malet understood the need for perfect timing if he hoped to achieve what he—and
others—had failed to do in the past: to overthrow Napoleon. To recognize the right opportunity
when it presented itself, he needed to understand the political and social atmosphere of France,
an easy enough task, he thought. He also needed to keep abreast of military events, another
straightforward undertaking, given his background and rapport with other high-ranking officers.
By October 1812, Malet believed that French society was ready—and eager—for a change of
regime. Loyalty to Napoleon constantly wavered, even among his closest advisors. Economic
conditions in France had faltered, and military endeavors in Russia were going poorly. Malet
began hatching his next plot to destroy the imperial government, anticipating support from highranking officials and soldiers, as well as the common citizens, all of whom he believed were
disillusioned with Napoleon's reign.
The political upheavals, which had persisted throughout the Revolution, had disappointed
the peasants and working class of French society, by far the great majority of the population.
They were content with none of the governments that gained power. Initially, the common
people anticipated improved conditions brought about by the liberal governments taking hold
after the fall of Louis XVI. Each passing year brought new political actors to the forefront, new
governments taking control, and new promises of peace and prosperity. Unfortunately, no one
was able to deliver the benefits expected by the peasants and working class. They were still
without sufficient work, and more dangerously, without sufficient food. Conditions improved
occasionally, but fleetingly. The common people wanted stability, peace, work, and food; they
cared not whether authority rested in the hands of a legislative assembly or of one man.
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Napoleon personified the hopes of the peasants and workers, and he enjoyed their support
from the moment he seized power on 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799). Here was a man who
had risen through the ranks due to his abilities, rather than any form of privilege extended to him
because of noble birth. Coming himself from humble beginnings, he would surely have the best
interests of the common people in mind. He was also a capable military commander who could
put to rest—through victory—the constant fighting both within the nation and against other
European powers. Although the peasants and working class immediately began hailing him as a
hero, not everyone was convinced.
General Malet was among those who considered the optimism premature. Napoleon had
overthrown a Republican government, and though the regime he created was technically
Republican as well, some citizens began to claim that he would bring about the death of the
liberties ushered in by the Revolution. Such assertions began in earnest with the plebiscite
introducing the Constitution of the Year VIII in December 1799, less than a month after 18
Brumaire. A saying that foreshadowed events to come echoed throughout Paris: “What is there
in the Constitution?—There is Bonaparte.”1 Although all male citizens over the age of twentyone had the right to vote on the Constitution, Malet and his fellow Republicans saw it as an
unfair and imbalanced process. Each commune had a register in which citizens simply signed
their names, followed by a yes or no. Some Frenchmen refused to vote, afraid of possible
repercussions in the future should they show support for the wrong issue. Such fear existed not
merely because Napoleon stood to benefit from the plebiscite’s outcome, but because the
political chaos of the last decade had been replete with retaliatory executions for not sharing the
ideology of the faction in power at any given time. Officials calmed the citizens’ fears and
persuaded them to participate by promising to burn the registers after the counting of the votes.
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The plebiscite’s official outcome was 3,011,007 votes to 1,562 in favor of the Constitution. The
new system retained a legislative branch, but it was clear that true authority would rest in the
hands of the executive branch composed of three Consuls: Napoleon, Cambacérès, and Lebrun.
Even among the Consuls, the partitioning of power was uneven. Napoleon, as First Consul, held
all true power with the other two Consuls playing solely advisory roles. Regardless of
motivation—fear or a sincere desire to see Napoleon lead the nation—France had effectively
voted itself into an autocracy with a slight Republican veneer.
His power legitimized through the Republican ballot, Napoleon took as his first task
making overtures of peace to hostile European monarchs. Napoleon was skilled at hiding his
true actions and intentions under the guise of what he perceived or expected to be society’s
values and desires. While generally portrayed as a power-hungry warmonger, Napoleon did at
least pretend to entertain diplomatic means to ending aggressions. On Christmas Day 1799, he
wrote to both King George III of England and Austrian Emperor Francis I announcing his new
political position and seeking a cessation of hostilities. Despite declaring to Francis I that his
primary interest was “to prevent the shedding of blood,” Napoleon had prepared that same day
his proclamation to the French people announcing that war would continue.2 Such double action
allowed him to take the moral high ground, or at least to appear as if he had. Here he was, a
newly elected leader, trying to bring peace to his nation only to see his efforts thwarted by vain
and selfish monarchs. Frenchmen flocked to support the war effort, expecting Napoleon to stay
on task and put a permanent end to the fighting as soon as possible. By making overtures toward
peace, Napoleon was well on his way to securing a stable foundation—peasants and the working
class—for his regime, regardless of what form it actually took.
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Napoleon immediately began pulling the Republican veil a bit further from his true
political intentions. The very day after overthrowing the Directory, he expressed his intention of
censoring the press. He explained, “If I give free reign to the press, I will not remain in power
three months.”3 Within two months of becoming First Consul, Napoleon imposed harsh
regulations on publications, reducing Paris' seventy-three newspapers to thirteen. A month later,
the law of 28 Pluviôse VIII (17 February 1800) finalized the removal of any true political power
from the French people, drawing it to himself. The legislation effectively ended the
independence of local administrations, the collegiate voting process, and the right to elect
officials. Although such a step did not seriously detract from the support Napoleon enjoyed from
the general public, it did strengthen the belief held by General Malet and his fellow Republicans
that France was heading back to autocracy. While such a prospect prompted fears among
Republicans that Napoleon would completely negate the gains of the Revolution, it gave
monarchists a slight glimmer of hope that their own goal could come to fruition.
Recognizing Napoleon’s efforts to consolidate political power in himself, monarchists
believed that citizens would begin to reject the idea of a Republican system and reacclimatize to
rule by one individual. They enjoyed a brief moment of hope that he would willingly support
and allow a Bourbon restoration. The future Louis XVIII, optimistic about the possibility of
such a transition, wrote himself to the First Consul on 20 February 1800. Not intending to
surrender power to the would-be monarch—or to anyone else for that matter—Napoleon replied:
“You must not hope for your return to France; you would have to walk over one hundred
thousand corpses. Sacrifice your interest to the peace and happiness of France; history will not
overlook you.”4 Whereas the general public believed that he had crushed the Bourbon’s hope to
reclaim the nation, Napoleon had not done so out of any Republican proclivities. Had a member
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from any of the previous Republican regimes presented him with a similar request, he would
have responded in the same fashion. The response had simply been in his own best interest.
Planning to lead the nation down a new governmental path without regard to any political
faction, Napoleon simultaneously encouraged and disheartened politically minded men of all
ideologies. He feared having to share power with anyone else, something he considered an
inevitable outcome should he associate himself with any particular group. The events of the
French Revolution had also proved to him that warring factions ultimately undermined whatever
regime happened to be in power at the time. Wanting to create a government above factions,
Napoleon explained to his brother Joseph: “I have composed my Council of State of exmembers of the Constituent Assembly, of moderates, Feuillants, Royalists, Jacobins. I am
national: I like honest men of all colours.”5 The key to his success, he believed, rested with the
general public, people who tended to put aside their ideologies as long as the current regime was
able to meet their daily needs. Although the people would be the foundation of his regime, he
recognized that if he wanted to ensure its permanence, he would need the support of experienced
and talented officials, men who would be less willing, however, to set aside their political beliefs
unconditionally. The situation forced Napoleon to find a way to buy the loyalty of the most
talented political and military officials while not favoring either Republicans or monarchists
more. Napoleon believed that with time these men would devote themselves sincerely to his
regime, leaving behind the hatred and hostilities of the Revolutionary past. Either he was
mistaken or the process took longer than he had anticipated. The consular and imperial regimes
were never without opponents attacking from all sides.
Napoleon, returning to his talent for playing double games, believed that he could further
strengthen his image among the peasants and working class by seeking a truce with Pope Pius

50

VII. Not only that, but by settling with the papacy he could placate the predominantly Catholic
nations of Europe, winning himself some allies or at least beginning to do so. On 5 June 1800,
just days before his victory at the Battle of Marengo, Napoleon declared to the clergy gathered in
Milan, “I hope to have the happiness of removing every obstacle which will hinder complete
reconciliation between France and the head of the Church.”6 He expected some resistance to
reconciliation with the Catholic Church, but also believed that the popularity brought to him
from his military victories thus far—especially with peace approaching—would be enough to
protect his regime from any backlash. Monarchists believed that an understanding between the
First Consul and the papacy would gravely affect their cause. They would lose one of their
strongest and most powerful supporters if Napoleon won Pope Pius VII to his side. Much to
their chagrin, negotiations began between the two leaders almost immediately. They needed to
act and to do so quickly.
Having failed in their attempt to place Louis XVIII on the throne of France through
diplomatic means shortly after Napoleon came to power and expecting to lose the Pope as an
ally, royalists resorted to less peaceable, though quicker, means. On Christmas Eve 1800, they
hatched a plot against the First Consul while on his way to the Opera to see a performance of
Haydn’s La Création. Three men dressed as workers pulled a wooden cart laden with two large
barrels and stones down the Rue St.-Niçaise where they expected Napoleon’s carriage to travel.
As the carriage came into sight, the men set fire to some straw on the cart before rushing to
safety. Barely missing the First Consul’s entourage, the wagon exploded, killing and maiming
dozens of innocent bystanders including a young girl the men had hired to watch the cart while
they were away. Napoleon had cheated death by only a few seconds.7
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Both Fouché and Dubois—Minister of Police and Prefect of Police, respectively—had a
hard time concluding who was responsible for the “infernal machine”, as the bomb became
known. Not satisfied with having to wait for their official findings, Napoleon hastily concluded
that the attempt had been the work of Republican fanatics. Even as contradictory evidence
surfaced, the First Consul held to his initial assumption. He produced a list containing over 130
names of alleged conspirators, each of whom ultimately found himself deported to the Seychelles
or Cayenne.
Ultimately, Dubois and Fouché were able to convince Napoleon that the plot had, in fact,
originated in the royalist camp. They pinned primary responsibility on General Georges
Cadoudal, a known monarchist in the pay of England. Still abroad, he was out of reach, though
several of his contacts within Paris found themselves arrested and summarily executed.
Scholarship has brought to light Cadoudal’s actual intentions, and they did not include
assassinating the First Consul. His plan had actually involved kidnapping Napoleon, not killing
him. The man he had hired to carry out the plot, Pierre Robinault de Saint-Réjant, known as
Pierrot, added the violent flourish. Whether or not they intended to kill or simply kidnap
Napoleon, the royalists had failed in their first attempt against the First Consul.
Despite the plot against his life, Napoleon continued negotiations with the Vatican,
though progress was slow as neither side was willing to compromise. Eventually Pope Pius VII
accepted the grim reality that if he hoped to restore the Catholic faith in France, he had no choice
but bow to Napoleon’s wishes. Napoleon categorically refused to return lands confiscated from
the Church during the Revolution or to pay restitution for them. Instead, he agreed to pay the
salaries of French clergymen, but with a stipulation attached: the Pope could only appoint
clerical officials from a list of candidates prepared by the First Consul. One of Pius’ greatest
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desires in negotiating was to restore the Catholic faith as the official religion of France.
Napoleon had no intention of allowing such appellation. He would acknowledge Catholicism as
the majority religion of France, but not as the religion as it had been under the Old Regime.
Pope Pius VII found the final terms of the Concordat unfavorable, though he deemed a truce
with Napoleon’s France necessary. The two officially established a peace—more political than
religious—between them on 15 August 1801.
Throughout the nation, news of the settlement roused both support and opposition. The
negotiations reassured peasants and members of the middle class who had purchased Church
lands that they would retain their new property. Catholics expressed a general sense of relief that
they could openly practice their religious beliefs without fear of reproach or persecution for the
first time since the institution of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy over a decade earlier.
Although believers throughout the nation welcomed the chance to return to worship, devout
Catholics were disgusted that while permitting the religion's existence within France, Napoleon
dared to place restrictions upon the papacy. The agreement also aggravated monarchists'
sentiments as it forced them to accept the loss of one of their most fervent and powerful allies,
the Pope. Openly expressing disgust over the agreement were Republicans and military men
alike, among both of whom Malet counted himself, who saw the Concordat as a betrayal of one
of the Revolution’s greatest victories. A comment made by a fiercely Republican general after
the churches reopened for Easter services in 1802 illustrates the frustration of the military: “It
was a beautiful speech. All that was missing were the 100,000 men who died to destroy what
you have revived today.”8 Despite his openly hostile attitude, the general had attended the
service.
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The Concordat did produce some disillusionment, but a majority of the population
remained more satisfied under Napoleon’s regime than under any government installed since the
Revolution began. The ratification of the Peace of Amiens between England and France on 25
March 1802 added to the First Consul’s level of support. The British hoped, though in vain, that
Napoleon would cease his efforts to expand French territory, satisfying himself with the borders
he had already achieved. Although the government was reluctant, the British people demanded
peace. French citizens too had longed for an end to a decade of nearly non-stop fighting. With
their allies out of commission—the Dutch fleet suffered a devastating defeat in April 1801, and
Russian czar Paul I was assassinated the following month—Napoleon and his troops were in no
position to launch an attack on England, an event about which he had fantasized since seizing
power. While there was a calm atmosphere within the nation and peace established on the
continent, Napoleon had his hands in military efforts elsewhere. His never-ending quest for
military glory would not permit his troops to enjoy the Peace of Amiens. Turning his focus to
the island of Saint Domingue (present day Haiti and the Dominican Republic) where Toussaint
L’Ouverture was leading a slave revolt in spring 1802, Napoleon made arrangements to send
forces to quash the rebellion.
Having looked forward to peace even more than the general public, Marshal JeanBaptiste Bernadotte and General Édouard Simon were discouraged to learn that they and their
troops were heading to the Caribbean. Both staunch Republicans, the officers allowed their
political inclinations to interfere with their military duties. Relying on the belief that their troops
would support any action that would bring about peace, the two officers concocted a plan, known
as the pots of butter plot, to rouse opposition to Napoleon among the soldiers then stationed in
Rennes. They hired a local printer to produce copies of announcements that General Simon had
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prepared for the troops. The letters decried a peace in which the troops could not participate and
pointed to that same situation to illustrate the idea that their beloved French Republic was dead.
He declared that Napoleon was no more than a tyrant who had seized power and destroyed the
Republic. Wanting to create as much hostility among the troops as possible, he insisted that the
glory they had won was being claimed by Napoleon for himself alone. Refusal to act against the
First Consul would cost, he warned, “your liberty, your existence, and your honor.”9 Although
they felt it necessary to act in some manner, neither Bernadotte nor Simon was willing to be the
one to hang or distribute the letters. Instead, they hid them in pots of butter, shipping them to
various commanders throughout the region and expecting their fellow officers to share their
perspective and to rally their own troops to the cause.
Unfortunately for the two military conspirators, their fellow officers either did not share
their opinion or did not want to risk their livelihoods—or even their lives—by participating in
anything that even resembled a plot against the First Consul. After all, it was to him that they
owed their rapid rise through the ranks. As Alexis de Tocqueville would explain, “it was only
the army whose every member without exception had profited from the Revolution and had a
personal interest in it.”10 Napoleon had recently established peace—at least temporarily—on the
continent and if he could do the same in the Caribbean, surely France’s fighting days would be
over. Ultimately, someone betrayed the plot, and within weeks, all the details of the plot had
been uncovered and seven men arrested, including Bernadotte and Simon. Napoleon refused to
believe that the conspiracy had posed him any serious threat, a sentiment which illustrates itself
in the punishments doled out to the men involved. Of the seven, the fate of two is unknown, two
served time in prison before being allowed to resume their lives under surveillance, one spent
time in prison before being exiled to the island of Oleron, and two immediately received official
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pardons. Despite being one of the two instigators, Marshal Bernadotte received a reprieve—he
was after all, Joseph Bonaparte’s brother-in-law. Peace held on the continent as troops
ultimately made their way to the Caribbean. Republicans had failed to capitalize on one of their
first attempts at raising opposition to Napoleon’s regime, as the majority of military men—
especially those of lower rank—and the general public supported the First Consul, regardless of
how much power he held for himself.
With peace among the European nations and economic conditions better than in previous
years, Napoleon recognized that the opportunity had presented itself for him to solidify his
regime even more. Manipulating the Senate’s offer to extend his term as Consul to ten years, he
persuaded them to offer him the position for life. Politicians hesitated, hoping to prevent the
First Consul from completing his quest to draw all power to himself, but the French people as a
whole did not oppose. Napoleon had brought them good times, and whether political power
rested in the hands of a legislative body or in one man was of no real concern to them. The
nation voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Constitution of the Year X, which initiated
Napoleon’s new title as Consul for Life in August 1802. Although he was not yet ready to
unveil his true imperial intentions, he had already succeeded in claiming all real power,
maintaining the Senate and two other Consuls solely to keep up the charade of Republicanism.
His ruse did not convince everyone. True Republicans were growing more and more agitated by
the Consul’s consolidation of authority, and royalists remained determined to see the Bourbons
restored to the same throne of France that Napoleon was trying to claim for himself.
General Cadoudal, the very man who had orchestrated the “infernal machine” plot in
December 1800, had not yet given up hope of destroying the Consulate. He had gone so far, in
fact, as to obtain the personal blessing of the Bourbon family, provided by the Count of Artois,
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the future Charles X. Despite the royal sanction, Cadoudal would enjoy less success this time
than previously: his plan never even fully materialized. Unfortunately for the conspirator, one
of his collaborators, Jean-Pierre Querelle, denounced the plans to police officials while making
his way to the firing squad for other charges. During the impromptu interrogation, he explained
that the plot’s purpose was “the reestablishment of the Bourbons . . . a movement in Paris
supported by the presence of a prince . . . [and] an attack against the First Consul by main
force.”11
Reacting in much the same fashion as after Cadoudal’s initial attempt, Napoleon rashly
reached his own conclusions without waiting for evidence to support or refute them. Alarmed
that the royal family itself had supported the effort, the First Consul immediately began
searching for the prince who would supposedly lead a movement against the regime in Paris.
Although Cadoudal and his co-conspirators were all in custody by early March 1804, they
refused to divulge any details of their plot, leaving the police to do detective work with few
leads. Under the guidance of Fouché and Foreign Minister Talleyrand—both of whom later
denied any involvement—Napoleon demanded the seizure of Louis de Bourbon Condé, Duke of
Enghien, from Ettenheim, a small German town near the border with France.
Enghien was brought to the Vincennes Château in Paris on 20 March 1804 to defend
himself before a hastily formed military commission that had already determined a verdict of
guilty even before his apprehension. The tribunal announced that he faced six charges: bearing
arms against the French people, offering his services to the English, an enemy of France,
harboring British agents and helping them to spy in France, trying to spark rebellions in
Strasbourg, leading a corps of émigrés on the French border, and spearheading a plot to
overthrow the Consular government. Admitting to having taken up arms against Revolutionary
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France, he was audacious enough to explain that had he not done so, he would not have been
able to face himself. He found the other charges positively ludicrous and vehemently denied
being involved in any such activities. He repeatedly demanded a personal meeting with
Napoleon but found each request denied. Predictably, the commission found him guilty,
sentencing him to an immediate death. With no means of appealing the decision and no chance
of speaking with the First Consul personally, he was lost. Taken to the courtyard where a firing
squad and freshly dug grave were waiting, Enghien, having had no ties to Cadoudal or his plot,
met with an unjustifiable death. Napoleon felt neither guilt nor remorse for his actions
concerning him. When asked about the decision to execute Enghien, he replied, “Under similar
circumstances today, I would do the same thing all over again. After all, am I simply some
miserable dog one can kill in the street with impunity, while my assassins are held sacrosanct?
When they attack my person, I return blow for blow.”12
Although the police had had Cadoudal and his accomplices in custody since early March,
their trial did not begin until two months after the Duke of Enghien’s execution, providing
enough time for one of the men to hang himself in his cell rather than face charges of conspiracy.
The others faced punishments of stunning variety. Any aristocrat associated with the plot
received an official pardon from the First Consul, as did Marshal Bernadotte—again. One of
Napoleon’s most intense rivals, General Jean Victor Moreau, the lone Republican in the
conspiracy, got two years in prison followed by expulsion from France. Twelve other men,
including Cadoudal, received death sentences. None of these fates and not the execution of the
Duke of Enghien roused the French public against Napoleon or his regime. They concerned
themselves more with life needs such as work and food than with who was in power, or what
type of regime he might be leading.

58

Napoleon correctly understood that the stability of his regime depended not solely on the
military victories he could earn, but also on the level of prosperity and comfort of the peasants
and working class. Within two months of the Consulate’s creation, their situation had vastly
improved over the conditions experienced during the Revolution. Noting the progress, the
Marquis de Lafayette remarked, “you know how many beggars there were . . . . We see no more
of them. The peasants are richer, the land better tilled, the women better clad.”13 Events of the
Revolution had shown Napoleon the power wielded by the lower classes. Bread riots could
easily get out of control, allowing any nearby political dissident to seize the opportunity of
raising support for his cause. Although the mediocre harvest of 1799 had caused the First
Consul some alarm, a decrease in bread prices conveniently coincided with his victory at the
battle of Marengo in June 1800. Grateful for such a fantastic victory and lowered bread prices,
the public adored their new leader. Napoleon was aware, however, that he could lose the
people’s devotion just as easily as he had gained it. He needed to continue winning on the
battlefield and improving conditions at home, realizing that neither task was sufficient alone to
maintain his regime.
Spring 1801 brought with it the economic conditions that Napoleon so dreaded. Bread
prices throughout the nation rose above a worker’s budget, reaching 18 sous for four pounds in
Paris by late summer. Having been in power for less than two years and doubting whether his
regime could survive widespread bread riots, Napoleon ordered the opening of soup kitchens
throughout the capital to help feed the poor. His most impressive effort to relieve the situation
was his command to purchase all the grain available from Dutch and English ports for immediate
shipment to Le Havre. The promptness with which Napoleon acted successfully calmed French
fears within three weeks. Having long since proven his abilities on the battlefield, the First
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Consul now displayed similar talent in economic affairs. Despite only 167,000 francs in the
nation’s coffers when he seized control of the government, he managed to balance the nation’s
budget at 500 million francs by 1802. He began repaying government bonds in cash, thereby
immediately improving his popularity among the bourgeoisie. Illustrating the stability of
France’s economy under Napoleon’s regime is the “Germinal franc,” worth .322 grams of gold.
The value of the Germinal franc held firm from its creation in March 1803 until the eve of World
War I in 1914.
In addition to the popularity achieved from his military talent and improvement of the
economy, Napoleon enjoyed a burst of support in response to the attempt on his life hatched
earlier in 1804. Addressing the Senate about the anger and fear that Cadoudal’s plot had
provoked in the public, Napoleon explained that such attempts caused him no personal fear. His
only worry concerned “the situation in which this great people would have found itself today had
the recent attempt succeeded.”14 To solve the issue, Senators began calling for the regime to
become hereditary and speaking about transforming the Consulate into an imperial government.
Napoleon accepted the offer of becoming Emperor of the French, but only with the people’s
consent. Although the public supported the change overwhelmingly—as the results of a
plebiscite would show on 6 November 1804—the prospect enraged anyone of dissimilar political
ideologies, including the monarchs of other European nations.
Ever the fervent royalist, General Cadoudal, still awaiting trial when the Senate
announced its decision to name Napoleon emperor, dejectedly remarked, “we have done more
than we hoped to do; we meant to give France a King, and we have given her an Emperor.”15
Sharing his desire to see a Bourbon restored to the throne of France, Europe’s monarchs had
never accepted the French Republic or the Consulate as legitimate governments. They
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considered Napoleon’s latest accomplishment an affront to ideological sensibilities, a sentiment
expressed by their participation in military efforts and various intrigues against him: he was a
usurper. No monarch personally attended the coronation held at Notre Dame on 2 December
1804, and most refused even to send a representative.
One leader that the Emperor could not afford to have decline his invitation was Pope Pius
VII. Napoleon believed that the papacy’s participation in the ceremony would give his regime
an undeniable legitimacy. When his requests for the Pope’s attendance went unanswered, the
Emperor resorted to begging and even to threatening the Church. Although he eventually agreed
to participate, he did so reluctantly. After crowning himself Emperor and his wife, Josephine,
Empress, Napoleon received yet another symbol of his power, this time from the Pope. Pius VII
explained that the imperial ring was “the sign of the Holy Faith, the proof of the strength and
solidity of your empire, by means of which, as a result of its triumphant power, you will conquer
your enemies and destroy heresies, on this imperial throne which Jesus the Christ, the King of
Kings and Lord of Lords in his eternal kingdom, affirms your reign with him.”16 Both Napoleon
and his opponents recognized the legitimacy granted to the imperial regime through the Church’s
blessing, but their opinions regarding it differed. Rejoicing in his accomplishment, the new
Emperor referred to himself as the “crowned representative of the Revolution triumphant,” while
royalists and other adversaries lamented the occasion as “the Revolution legitimized and even
sanctified.”17
The former First Consul had finally removed the thin Republican veil under which he had
hidden his intentions for so long, revealing a throne with laurel leaves and a golden “N”. With
the Emperor’s true political aims realized, Republicans had no choice but to acknowledge that if
they wanted to restore their preferred form of government, violence was the only answer.
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Wasting no time, a young student rushed through the celebrating crowd and headed toward
Napoleon. His shouts of “Freedom or death!” quickly drew the attention of the Imperial Guard
who captured him without incident.18 Napoleon believed that anyone who hoped to assassinate
him or otherwise overthrow his government would need a more well thought out plan than
simply shouting like a madman and brandishing a weapon. He explained to one of his aides that
because his daily schedule changed constantly it was nearly impossible to pinpoint his location at
any given moment. Beyond the impromptu effort on the day of the coronation, the initial years
of Napoleon's reign as Emperor saw no significant attempts against his life, allowing him to
focus on social aspects of his realm, in addition to his ever-present military endeavors.
Napoleon believed that the chaotic course of the Revolution had so inundated the nation
with various ideologies and social values, that it was impossible for citizens to know which path
was correct. He explained that as “long as one does not learn from childhood whether to be
republican or monarchist, Catholic or nonreligious, etc., the State will not form a nation; it will
rest on a vague and uncertain base; it will be constantly exposed to changes and disorders.”19 If
no one took the time to explain the just and proper ways of society and politics, hostility and
confusion would continue to plague the nation. Young women would obtain the training they
required from their mothers. Recognizing that orphan girls would not have this opportunity, he
did establish a handful of schools dedicated to their education. The curriculum centered
primarily on religion, though it also covered reading, writing, and arithmetic necessary for
household management. Napoleon's personal focus was ensuring the education of an elite group
of boys who would serve his regime in some official capacity.
Wanting to establish conformity among the impressionable minds of the youth who
would eventually become his military and government officials, he replaced the Directory's
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secondary schools with his own more centralized ones—lycées—in May 1802. He would
exercise direct control over the schools' curriculum until 1808, when members of his Imperial
University took over the task. Students studied basic subjects such as reading, history, and Latin
until the age of twelve, when they separated into two categories: those who would pursue
military careers and those destined for civilian careers. In either case, all students wore uniforms
and participated in drills and physical training, illustrating the importance of military affairs in
Napoleonic France. By 1805, the Emperor had founded 39 lycées and 1,083 secondary schools,
far surpassing the number established by any previous regime.20 Given his belief in providing
opportunities based on merit rather than upbringing or heritage, Napoleon created 2,500
scholarships to assist boys of lesser means obtain the education more readily available to others.
Guaranteeing a certain level of competency among those who completed their education,
Napoleon established the baccalaureate examination in 1809, a system still in place today. His
education system would produce noticeable results, raising literacy from 37 percent to 54 percent
among men and from 27 percent to over 35 percent among women.21
In addition to improving the education system, Napoleon brought the nation more
economic stability than it had enjoyed during the Revolutionary era. Hardships did occur, but
the Emperor's prompt responses prevented such situations from reaching the crisis level as they
had in the past. Despite decreasing liberties and nearly constant warfare—peace had lasted only
fourteen months during the Consulate—the masses supported their leader. They continued to
praise him as the “Savior of the Revolution,” even after taking the title of Emperor. An imperial
official remarked, “they were among his warmest partisans, because he reassured them against
the return of tithes, feudal rights, the restitution of property to émigrés, and the oppression of the
lords.”22 Republicans continuously denounced Napoleon as the executioner of Revolutionary
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gains, but they could not legitimately deny that many of his policies were remnants of their own
legislation.
Although the working class never fully complied, the Chapelier Law of 1791, which
banned coalitions ouvrières (guilds and unions) and forbade striking, remained in effect during
the Consulate and Empire. Workers still banded together and refused to work, but their protests
never took on a political character. The introduction of machinery made workers fear their
expendability and prompted several incidents including one in Lille in 1805. In an attempt to
prevent the lengthening of their workday, stonecutters employed at the Louvre went on strike
that same year. One of the most violent episodes, which resulted from an accident at the Arc de
Triomphe in March 1810, required armed forces to quell the revolt. While the Chapelier Law
was a holdover from the Revolution, Napoleon did enact some measures of his own concerning
employment. The Law of 22 Germinal X (12 April 1803) required all workers to present their
employers with their livret, a type of identification card documenting their name and address.
Employers kept the cards until the worker left the job for other employment or military service.
Such a process allowed police forces to track an individual’s movement, to monitor the possible
existence of dangerous gatherings, and to ensure that workers could not avoid military service
when conscripted.
In addition to the loss of personal liberties, Republicans mourned the creation of new
hierarchies within society. They took issue with the establishment of the Legion of Honor in
May 1802, decrying its ranking system despite a membership based on talent and merit rather
than wealth or heritage. The honorary titles granted to its members notwithstanding, the Legion
did not, in fact, constitute a true elite. But the opposite was true when Napoleon created an
imperial aristocracy in 1808 which, disregarding any titles that had existed prior to the
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Revolution, depended instead on loyalty to the Emperor—or at least the appearance thereof—
and financial affluence. Men who hoped to join the new nobility needed a personal fortune of
between 50,000 and 4 million francs, depending on the rank they sought. Over the next six
years, Napoleon appointed 3,263 noblemen ranging from chevalier to prince. Although he
reestablished an aristocracy, its composition differed greatly from its predecessor: only 22
percent of its members had held titles under the Old Regime, while 58 percent were modest
bourgeois lawyers, doctors and industrialists, and 20 percent were from other levels of society.
The imperial nobility did not contradict the peasants' concept of Revolutionary gains because the
new system did not restore the rights and privileges of the old nobility. As positive police
reports continued and assassination attempts ceased, Napoleon's confidence continued to grow.
Years of ruling without any significant attempts on his life and favorable daily police reports
announcing that "the multitude . . . loves the Emperor" eventually bolstered Napoleon's
confidence in the stability of his regime.23 In 1808, he explained to one of his officials that "we
have acquired the right to think no man will make an attempt on Our life until Providence so
wills it."24
The following fall brought the destruction of the Emperor's serenity. On 12 October
1809, an eighteen-year-old Saxon named Frédéric Staaps attended a parade in Schönbrunn with
the intention of assassinating Napoleon. Wielding a large kitchen knife, he made his way toward
the Emperor but found his efforts thwarted by several imperial guards before Napoleon even
noticed his presence. Given the man’s age, Napoleon was curious about his motive and
interrogated him personally. The young man claimed, “The voice of God told me that the death
of a single man would pacify everything.”25 Four days after his arrest, he heard continuous
cannon fire outside the prison and asked the reason. Told that the commotion was in celebration
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of the peace just signed between France and Austria two days earlier, he threw his hands in the
air and looked to the ceiling, proclaiming, “Oh God, how I thank you! Peace is made, and I am
not an assassin!”26 His joy was short lived, however, as he faced the firing squad less than two
hours later.
The attempt caused Napoleon no physical harm but significantly damaged his belief in
the stability of his regime. Recognizing the possibility that news of the young man's effort could
spark more attempts against his life, he wrote immediately to Minister of Police Fouché back in
Paris explaining that while the incident had not been serious, the news was to be withheld.
Should the attempt become common knowledge, Napoleon declared, “it would be necessary to
have the fellow certified as insane,” thus reducing the gravity of his actions in the public’s
mind.27 The situation also made more important a concern that Napoleon had held for some
years: there was no hope that his marriage to Josephine would produce an heir. He did not want
to see his empire divided among his brothers, an event he expected to occur should he die
without an heir of his own. Regardless of the support he might receive from the French masses,
his regime would never be the permanent institution he hoped it to be unless he had a son.
In addition to threats from malcontents of dubious sanity, the Empire faced trouble within
its own ranks as well, for several of Napoleon’s own officials began plotting against him.
Talleyrand had held secret meetings with representatives from hostile nations, especially
England, while one of Fouché’s highest-ranking subordinates was in communication with
Austrian Minister of State Klemens von Metternich. Fouché’s own efforts in the fall 1809 were
even more questionable. Professing to fear an invasion of Belgium by English and Austrian
forces, he levied a large body of National Guardsmen in Paris and several other departments to
repel the expected attack. Because he acted without Napoleon’s permission—in his Mémoirs
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Fouché would claim he had authorization—the potentially dangerous gathering quickly drew the
attention of Minister of War Henri Clarke, who then denounced Fouché as a Jacobin traitor intent
on overthrowing the Empire and claiming power for himself.28 Upon his return to the capital
city, Napoleon immediately met with the Minister of Police, asking him threateningly, “Are you
aware, Monsieur Fouché, that I could have you executed?”29 Instead, the Emperor simply
removed him from his position, replacing him with Marie Savary.
Having returned to Paris and addressed the issues of internal strife among his officials,
Napoleon turned his focus to the unpleasant task of informing Josephine of their impending
divorce. Despite the numerous infidelities committed on both sides, the two had truly cared for
one another. After a strained and quiet dinner, the Emperor bluntly—if not cruelly—explained
his reasoning: “I need a womb.”30 The Empress was not surprised, devastated though she was.
Her fear of such a fate had grown alongside Napoleon’s power. She recognized that he could
never achieve his ultimate goal of creating a dynasty as long as their marriage continued. On 15
December 1809, the imperial couple announced their divorce to a room full of courtiers. The
occasion was emotional for both. Having thanked Josephine for their time together, he sat, in
tears, on his throne. Before her own emotions forced her to stop, the Empress declared that she
was proud of having the opportunity to make such a sacrifice on behalf of France. ArchChancellor Cambacérès then announced the Senate’s decree that the divorce was complete and
bestowed upon Josephine a pension of two million francs.
Now officially divorced, Napoleon turned his attention to finding Josephine’s successor.
He perceived two especially advantageous candidates: Czar Alexander I’s sister and Austrian
Emperor Francis I’s daughter. He pursued the Russian option first, but Alexander replied that
his sister, not yet sixteen years old, was simply too young to wed. Perhaps after a few years had
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passed, the Czar suggested, the proposition might be reconsidered. Napoleon was unwilling to
wait. Two and a half months after suggesting a marriage alliance with Russia, he proposed the
same to Austria. Emperor Francis approved the union but not from any sincere desire to ally
with France. As State Minister Metternich explained, the marriage was a necessary maneuver in
order “to avoid all military action and to flatter . . . until the day of deliverance.”31 Obediently,
the nineteen-year-old Marie-Louise traveled to France, becoming Napoleon’s second wife on 11
March 1810.
Although the fact that his new bride was young and healthy enough to bear him children
satisfied Napoleon, the French people did not share his sentiment. Less than two decades earlier,
they had declared their violent hatred and distrust of another Austrian bride by beheading MarieAntoinette. Now they found her niece as their new empress. Rumors spread after the marriage
that anyone who had voted in favor of the deaths of Louis XVI and his queen would face exile.
The divorce also disappointed Revolutionaries because Josephine was one of their own, having
spent time in prison after petitioning for the release of her estranged Jacobin husband. Napoleon
incorrectly believed that the union would earn him respect and acceptance among Europe’s other
monarchs. Yet no matter whom he took for his wife, the European monarchs vowed never to
accept a Bonaparte among their ranks. The Emperor was also under the mistaken impression
that with a marriage alliance in place Austria would support his aspirations, allowing him to
continue expanding his territory and power. Although no one but Napoleon himself truly
approved of the union, its value became apparent when the couple announced Marie-Louise’s
pregnancy a few months later.
Napoleon rejoiced at the possibility, but his opponents recognized that their goal of
overthrowing the Empire would become more difficult once the Emperor finally had a male heir.
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Embarking upon a solo mission to liberate Europe from Napoleonic tyranny, an eighteen-yearold Prussian nobleman, Baron Dominique de la Sahla, planned to assassinate both the Emperor
and his unborn child in February 1811. Unfortunately for him, rumor of his intentions reached
Prefect of Police Étienne-Denis Pasquier before he could act. Upon his arrest, he willingly led
police to his hotel room where they discovered twelve pistols, a veritable arsenal. During his
interrogation, he readily and unapologetically explained that he had intended to murder
Napoleon, expecting the loss to overwhelm the Empress causing her to suffer a miscarriage. He
added smugly that he had twice, unnoticed, shot at the Emperor. Despite the gravity of his
attempt, la Sahla did not receive the death penalty that many other would-be assassins had.
Minister of Police Savary succeeded in convincing Napoleon to imprison the teenager
indefinitely rather than execute him. His fellow inmates referred to him as “the obstetrician of
Marie-Louise.”32 Upon his release in March 1814, brought about as the result of Napoleon’s
impending abdication, he returned to Prussia and lived peacefully. When news a year later of the
Emperor’s escape from Elba and triumphant return to Paris reached him, la Sahla took up his
sinister cause once more. Carrying a small packet of explosive powder by which he intended to
assassinate Napoleon, the young man accidentally frustrated his own plan. He took a carriage to
the meeting place of the legislative body where the Emperor was spending the day. As he
stepped down from the carriage into the rain, he slipped, and in falling to the ground caused the
powder to detonate. After a short stay in the hospital, he was returned to prison until he was
freed again upon Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. He seemed to believe that his life had only one
purpose, that of killing Bonaparte. Realizing that Napoleon’s exile on Saint Helena destroyed
any chance of success, he threw himself into the Seine two months after his release from prison.
He died shortly thereafter of a resulting illness.
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La Sahla’s plan having failed, Marie-Louise gave birth to a son, known as the King of
Rome, on 20 March 1811. Napoleon rejoiced at the news, believing that he had succeeded in
making his imperial regime permanent through a hereditary succession. The masses shared
Napoleon’s hope that European monarchs would finally acknowledge the regime’s legitimacy.
They were excited at the prospect of peace: now that the Emperor had a son, he would put war
aside to supervise the child’s upbringing. Minister of Police Savary wrote, the "people sincerely
anticipated a period of profound peace; the idea of war and occupations of that sort were no
longer entertained as being realistic."33 But if Europe still considered Napoleon a usurper, was
any long-term peace possible?
Economic hardships beginning in 1811 brought a second anxiety. The high cost and
shortage of bread resulting from a mediocre harvest in 1810 became more burdensome after an
even less successful crop the following year. By March 1812, bread prices in Paris had reached
18 sous per loaf—officials considered 20 sous per loaf a critical situation. Napoleon recognized
that prices were more unreasonable in rural areas but focused primarily on keeping food
available to the capital city for fear that bread riots in Paris could quickly transform into largescale revolts. The situation required immediate attention because "the government is there, and
soldiers do not like to shoot at women with babies on their backs who come screaming to the
bakeries."34 No significant revolting occurred within the capital, allowing the Emperor to enact
legislation to relieve the situation throughout the rest of the nation. He returned to the idea of
soup kitchens which had proved effective early in his reign. Serving Rumford soup—a
concoction that required no flour and was allegedly as nutritious as bread—these establishments
provided the sole means of survival for nearly one-third of the population in some of the more
rural sections of France. With deteriorating conditions at home, would the masses continue to
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support the renewal of war if they saw the fighting less to guarantee Revolutionary gains and
more to satisfy the Emperor’s personal ambition?
While his regime made extensive use of the process, forced military service was not one
of Napoleon's own inventions. Enacted under the Directory, the Jourdan Law of 19 fructidor VI
(5 September 1798) required all eighteen-year-old males to register for the draft, though they
would not serve until they reached ages twenty to twenty-five. Registration did not necessarily
mean that military service was inevitable. Men could legally avoid service if they were the head
of a household, married, or the only son in their family. Members of certain professions, such as
clergymen and doctors, also enjoyed exemption. A lottery system determined which citizens
would serve and those selected underwent physical examinations to exclude anyone unfit,
including men under five feet tall. Until 1808, 90 percent of those citizens deemed capable of
military service reported for duty. Despite the magnitude of the Napoleonic wars, employment
in the military rarely accounted for more than 3 percent of the population.35 Between 1800 and
1814, two million Frenchmen—approximately 7 percent of the nation's entire population—found
themselves drafted.36 Citizens became truly alarmed and defiant only when levies began calling
for more than one million individuals after the catastrophic fiasco in Russia in 1812.
Although he eventually chose to pursue it, Napoleon did recognize the difficulties that
invading Russia would entail. His political and military officials consistently advised against
such an action, pointing to the failure of numerous leaders in the past, such as Charles XII of
Sweden. Initially, Napoleon appeared to accept their counsel, assuring Russian diplomats that he
had neither the desire nor the intention to declare war on their nation: "It would be a crime on
my part, for I would be making war without a purpose, and I have not yet, thanks to God, lost my
head; I am not mad."37 As alternatives to aggression became less feasible, however, he began
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making arrogant declarations that his troops could never lose to those of Czar Alexander. He
guaranteed his advisors that he understood when and how to embark on an invasion of Russia
and that the endeavor was not as hopeless or foolhardy as they insisted. His overconfidence was
obvious in every statement he made concerning the impending assault. He had everything under
control and all would go according to his plan.
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CHAPTER THREE—GENERAL MALET’S FINAL ATTEMPT, 22 OCTOBER 1812
On the night before Napoleon was to lead his Grande Armée into Russia, Prefect of
Police Étienne Pasquier found himself fearing the possibility of the Emperor’s enemies trying to
capitalize on his lengthy absence. If such circumstances arose, there would be no one in Paris
with sufficient authority to quash the attempt. Having considered the prefect’s concerns,
Napoleon paced around the room and replied, “Yes, there is certainly some truth in what you say
. . . but one must accomplish what has been undertaken.”1 With that, the Emperor dismissed the
subject and bid Pasquier a goodnight.
Sharing a similar philosophy, General Malet had never ceased plotting against the Empire
despite the time he spent in prison and at the private rest home of Doctor Dubuisson after the
failure of his previous attempts. Confident that his plan of May 1808—replicated government
documents and co-conspirators among high-ranking officials—offered the best hope of success,
he had begun revising it almost immediately after its failure. He accepted no responsibility for
the disappointing outcome of that effort; instead, he blamed two of his cohorts who had been
unable to keep their temperaments under control. Initially, he had taken to the extreme his desire
to limit his accomplices, leading to a hastily fabricated one-man attempt to overthrow the
government at the Te Deum of 29 June 1809. After this embarrassing failure, he acknowledged
the futility of acting alone and began seeking out trustworthy confidants.
His unsuccessful attempts at overthrowing Napoleon’s Empire had cost Malet less than
two years in prison. Despite escaping from La Force—one of Paris’ most notorious prisons—
Malet found his request for transfer from Saint-Pélagie to the private rest home of Doctor
Dubuisson granted by Prefect of Police Dubois in January 1810. Always trying to manipulate
situations to serve his own interests, Malet most likely applied for the change of residence not
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out of genuine concern for his health, as he claimed, but out of a perceived opportunity to strike
against the Emperor yet again. Whether Dubois had hoped to purchase Malet’s loyalty by
granting the relocation or whether he simply believed that the General, now in his mid-fifties,
would have finally abandoned his treacherous ways is unknown. Whatever his reasoning had
been, he unwittingly provided the determined dissident a dangerous opportunity, one that Malet
quickly seized.
Doctor Dubuisson's rest home in no way provided the security measures in place at either
La Force or Saint-Pélagie. The residence more closely resembled a retirement center for
criminals than a facility intended to keep them within the law and under surveillance. Pasquier,
who had replaced Dubois as Prefect of Police in 1810, explained that "any one confined in a
private hospital was simply looked upon as a prisoner on parole, and nothing was easier for him
than to escape, as in those places there were neither guard, wicket, railing, or bolt. The
proprietor of the establishment was alone responsible for those entrusted to his care…."2 The
small and relaxed environment allowed Malet's friends and family to visit as they pleased, often
with no supervision. Using such visits to obtain information about the public opinion of
Parisians and about Napoleon's latest military endeavors, Malet closely monitored events in
preparation for a new attempt at ridding France of its allegedly tyrannical leader.
The relaxed security at Dubuisson’s also allowed him to converse freely with fellow
prisoner Abbé Jean Lafon, a dedicated royalist, who ultimately convinced him that a successful
strike against the Empire would require the joint effort all anti-Bonapartist camps.3 United in
their belief that a conspiracy involving too many people would be doomed from its outset, the
two men further continued revising Malet’s original plot, taking into consideration their desire to
inform as few people as possible of their intentions.4 Although security was nearly non-existent
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at the rest home, they acknowledged the need for accomplices on the outside who could handle
various preparatory details. Turning to men with whom they were already acquainted, they
confided in three additional men: Abbé José de Caâmano, a Spanish cleric whom Lafon had met
while both men were serving time at La Force, Alexandre Boutreux, a law student and political
dissident whom Malet most likely met through the clandestine group known as the Philadelphes,
and Jean Rateau, a distiller turned career military man.5
Despite various revisions—fewer people aware of the plot and no accomplices already
installed in the government—the plot closely resembled Malet's plan of 1808, using the
announcement of Napoleon’s death as grounds for the changes explained in a forged senatusconsulte and in orders to the troops stationed in Paris. To convince military officials that the
orders he would deliver were valid, Malet planned to wear his own military decorations, clearly
marking him as a general. He also wanted his accomplices to exude legitimacy and entrusted the
acquisition of several additional uniforms and weapons to his wife and Rateau. On the chosen
date for the plot, Malet and Lafon would escape from Dubuisson’s rest home and meet their coconspirators at Abbé Caâmano’s home. After changing into their uniforms and arming
themselves, the men would head to the nearby Popincourt barracks and present the forged orders
to the officers in charge. Once in control of several military units, Malet would lead the troops to
various strategically important locations throughout the city, arresting high-ranking political
officials—and anyone else who might dare to stand in his way—and replacing them with men he
deemed worthy as the plot unfolded. His initial accomplices—Lafon, Caâmano, Boutreux and
Rateau—would not receive positions in the new government but, presumably, would collect
other forms of reward once the plot succeeded.
To achieve the individual tasks which would culminate in the creation of Malet’s
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provisional government, the conspirators relied on both speed and the element of surprise. Malet
believed that he would be able to persuade military and government officials to follow him
simply by presenting authentic-looking orders and by explaining that the Senate had had to act
immediately on learning of the Emperor’s death. He wanted his actions seen as the result of the
deliberate and legal decisions made by the Senate, not as a revolution. Success would be his,
Malet thought, once his accomplices had replaced all critical political positions and his
provisional government had met at the Hôtel de Ville. Adhering to Lafon's idea that a successful
overthrow would need to placate monarchists as well as republicans, Malet chose men from both
political camps to serve in his provisional government.6 Once assembled, he would announce to
the new regime the abolition of the imperial government and make three crucial declarations:
that Napoleon was an outlaw, a seemingly unnecessary step if, in fact, the Emperor had died, that
his marriage to Marie-Louise was annulled and that the King of Rome was illegitimate to prevent
the possibility of him inheriting his father’s throne.7 After such announcements, Malet believed
he would finally have succeeded in overthrowing Napoleon’s regime.
The difficult question of what exactly to do with Marie-Louise and the King of Rome
should his plan succeed remained for Malet to decide. Allegedly, he planned to remove the two
imperial family members from the country. The London Times reported that the Empress had
received a letter from Malet, which she was supposed to believe came from her father, the
Emperor of Austria. The letter supposedly informed her of Napoleon's death and urged her to
join his Ambassador in fleeing to Strasbourg and so avoid any fallout from her husband's demise.
Instead of delivering her toward the Austrian border, however, the carriage would take her to
Dieppe, where she and her son would board a ship for England. Other reports of the supposed
plot against Marie-Louise state that she would return to Austria, because of her "illustrious
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birth."8 Whatever their actual destination, it is likely that Malet intended no physical harm to
either of the imperial figures. He needed to keep them safe in order to assure that Austria would
support, or at least tolerate, the existence of his regime. With the plans finalized, all that
remained was waiting for the perfect opportunity to put the plot into action.
In October 1812, several weeks would pass without any news reaching Paris from the
Emperor and his Grande Armée. The lack of information quickly prompted rumors and
speculation as to what might be happening in Russia. Already aware that the campaign had not
gone well, Parisians were increasingly nervous as each day passed. Thinking the city rife with
inquietude and disillusionment, Malet believed that the latest opportunity for him to strike
against Napoleon had presented itself. With the Emperor in Russia and no imperial bulletins
forthcoming, he knew that verification of the imperial death would be a slow and difficult
undertaking. Given the recent lack of information received from the army, Malet did not expect
such an announcement to meet much, if any, disbelief, especially if seemingly-official
government documents seconded the claim. The nation’s current situation caused him to think
“that the downfall of Napoleon not only might be brought about, but was bound to occur
immediately. He persuaded himself that it could readily be compassed with very slight action,
especially if such action was taken in Paris.”9 Confident that the time to act had come, Malet
advised his four accomplices that they would implement their plot on the night of 11 October.
Again, he would see his plans foiled through no fault of his own. Whereas uncontrolled
temperaments had prevented success in 1808, Malet’s new efforts would be impeded by delays,
both preventable and not.
On the chosen night, Malet and Lafon successfully escaped from the rest home and
arrived at Abbé Caâmano’s residence without difficulty. Once there, they settled several last
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minute details such as dating the forged senatus-consulte and the orders to various military units
stationed throughout the city. Rateau was to provide the conspirators’ uniforms and weapons,
the final necessary step before initiating the plot itself. As the designated meeting time passed,
however, Rateau was still missing. When he finally did arrive toward morning, his fellow
conspirators feared that the most opportune moment had passed.10 As the group disbanded for
the night, Malet and Lafon returned to Dubuisson’s. Although they had escaped undetected,
their effort to break back into the rest home drew the attention of their overseer. He reprimanded
them for having left the facility without permission and warned that he intended to advise
Minister of Police, René Savary, Duke of Rovigo, of their flight. Whether or not he ever filed
such a report is unknown, but regardless of what action he took—or failed to take—the two
prisoners had not yet resigned themselves to failure. Despite the setback and the now incorrect
date on their counterfeit documents, they decided to reschedule their plot for 22 October, a date
by which they hoped Dubuisson would again have relaxed his watch over them.
Dubuisson locked the residence at 11:00 pm each night after ensuring that his three
charges were in their rooms.11 Having successfully slipped out of the rest home eleven nights
earlier, Malet and Lafon had no worries about doing it again. With Dubuisson aware that they
were in their rooms, the two conspirators climbed out of their windows into the courtyard and
retraced their steps back to Abbé Caâmano’s residence. Unlike their prior attempt, everyone
arrived without delay. Considering the torrential rain falling outside, the group decided to
postpone taking immediate action, choosing instead to drink punch while waiting for a break in
the weather.12 According to Ernest Hamel, this initial delay brought about the failure of Malet’s
plot. In his opinion, “if things had been executed during the night, not a single civil or military
authority would have had the time to recognize [what was happening], and the conspiracy would
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probably have enjoyed complete success.”13
Finally, the group acknowledged that any action that night would have to take place in
the rain. As Malet reached the door to leave, Abbé Lafon stopped him. He seemed to have lost
confidence and begged the General not to attempt the overthrow. “Stay,” he pleaded, “the
guillotine is at the door.”14 Dismissing his accomplice’s fears and still determined to restore the
French Republic, he set out with Rateau and Boutreux around 3:30 a.m.15 The two clergymen
remained behind as Caâmano’s task of providing a meeting place was complete and Lafon was
too nervous for any further active participation.
By 4:00 a.m., the trio of conspirators had made their way through Paris' rainy streets to
the Popincourt barracks, where Malet planned to obtain the military force with which he would
overthrow the Empire.16 Upon reaching the garrison's entrance, Malet provided the morning's
password and gained immediate access. The day’s key word—ironically, “conspiration”
(conspiracy)—had been delivered to the General that afternoon by a soldier stationed at
Popincourt.17 He quickly sought out Colonel Gabriel Soulier, the man in charge of the National
Guardsmen stationed at the barracks. Initially, Soulier seemed of little use to Malet for he was
asleep, suffering from fever and influenza, but the illness was a lucky accident for the
conspirator. Fuzzy minded, Soulier neglected to inspect the forged senatus-consulte and Orders
of the day intended for the Guardsmen carried by Malet and paid little attention to the personal
letter summarizing the actions to be undertaken.18 Had he thoroughly reviewed the documents,
he would have noticed several questionable aspects that may have brought the conspiracy to an
end before it began. Instead, he relied solely on Malet's summary of the fraudulent documents.
Malet explained to Soulier that "the Senate is assembled. The Emperor died on the 7th of this
present month before Moscow; and we come to give you information of a Senatus Consultum
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given this night, with an Order of the day, and a letter addressed to you, concerning the service
with which you are charged under these circumstances; and in which you will act in concert with
M. Frochot, Prefect of the Seine."19 Soulier also learned that he was to receive a promotion to
general and was also to cash an order for 100,000 francs, signed by Malet. He was to distribute
the funds among the men at Popincourt as a sign that they would receive their pay on time under
the pending regime. Ordinary Guardsmen would receive higher than normal recompense and
officers twice their normal rate.20
Soulier was to read the announcement of Napoleon's death to the Guardsmen before
arming his troops and leading them to the Place de Grève and Hotel de Ville, where he was to
make arrangements for a room in which the provisional government could meet later that
morning. He was also to station a detachment at the bell tower of Saint-Jean. When the time
came, the tocsin would sound, calling everyone in Paris to action.21 Explaining that his sorrow
over the news of the Emperor's death had exacerbated his illness, Soulier opted to remain in bed
for awhile longer, appointing Adjutant-Major Piquerel to inform the Guardsmen of the recent
developments. By lamplight in the pouring rain, the troops learned that the Emperor had died in
Russia and that the nation would immediately return to a Republic. General Malet, now in
charge of the government, promised them "promotions, rewards, and vacations."22 Recorded in
various memoirs, the reaction to the news varies depending upon the source. Some describe
"cries of Vive la nation," while others report that "there was not a cry, not a word, nothing but a
great stupor."23 Whatever the actual response, Soulier pulled himself from bed to undertake his
orders while Malet personally led 1,200 men to La Force prison.24
By 6:30 a.m., Malet and his troops arrived at the prison where he planned to free several
prisoners whom he believed would help further his plot. He immediately ordered the release of
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General Joseph Guidal and General Victor Lahorie—two men with whom he had previously
served—and a Corsican, Joseph Boccheiampe, a seemingly random choice. The order met with
no resistance. When the door of his cell opened with orders to follow the guard, Guidal believed
that the time for his transfer to Marseille for trial had come.25 Lahorie could conjure no
explanation for his impromptu release and, therefore, "was slow in making his appearance; he
was abed when called, and he took some time to get ready."26 Finally appearing before his
liberators, he recognized Malet as a fellow soldier, though he thought he had been a prisoner for
some time. Although both men were aware of Malet's status as a known political malcontent,
they had no more misgivings about the announcement of a provisional government than those
unfamiliar with his past. Convinced that the news of Napoleon's death was legitimate, the three
men brought the plot closer to reestablishing the French Republic.27
Malet gave copies of his forged senatus-consulte to his three newly-released accomplices.
He ordered them to seize the offices or personal apartments of several key political figures
throughout the city, to arrest these men, and then to take their place in power. Boccheiampe
made his way to the Prefecture of the Seine where he encountered no resistance in establishing
himself as Prefect because Count Nicolas Frochot, who currently held the position, had not yet
arrived at the office.28 Lahorie and Guidal went immediately to the home of Minister of Police
Savary. They found him still in bed and had little trouble placing him under arrest.29 With
Savary on his way to La Force prison, Lahorie took control of this key ministry. Although he
had not actively resisted the news of his arrest and replacement, Savary's life was in danger.
Malet had authorized each man assisting him to use any method of coercion or intimidation—
including unrestricted violence—to achieve the plot's goal.30 Only Lahorie's intervention kept
Savary safe from the wrath of Guidal, a gratuitously violent man. As the former Minister was
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led to prison, Lahorie told him, "Fear not...for you have fallen into the hands of a generous
enemy, and you shall not be put to death."31 Abiding by the promise given by his comrade,
Guidal did not harm Savary, though he constantly threatened to do so.
Shortly after 7 a.m., having installed Savary at La Force, Guidal led Boutreux and a
detachment of Guardsmen to the personal apartments belonging to Prefect of Police Pasquier.32
Pasquier examined the order calling for his arrest and the forged senatus-consulte that Guidal
presented to him, immediately concluding that each document was fraudulent. In his memoirs,
Pasquier noted, "it was an easy matter for me to see at a glance that these documents were
apocryphal, and concocted by men who were ignorant of the form in which they were usually
couched."33 Placed in a carriage destined for La Force prison, Pasquier—whose position
Boutreux seized—attempted to convince his escort that "he was the dupe of a gross imposture,
that he was doubtless not aware of the consequences of his participating in a most guilty
enterprise, and that it might cost him his life."34 The explanation went unheeded.
Colonel Soulier had pulled himself from bed and arrived at the Hotel de Ville by 7:30
a.m.35 Count Frochot, the Prefect of the Seine, had received a sloppily scrawled note earlier that
morning stating that the Emperor was dead. Rushing to his office to seek details, he arrived
shortly after Soulier and his Guardsmen. Soulier presented Frochot with copies of Malet's forged
senatus-consulte and Orders of the Day which, unlike himself, Frochot carefully examined.
Finding discrepancies in these documents, he began questioning Soulier about the situation: "I
immediately looked for the signature, and finding it to be Malet, demanded to know why it was
not signed by General Hulin, and who was this General Malet? The Commandant replied, 'my
General is wounded, and General Malet is Chief, or one of the Chiefs of the General Staff'."36
Whereas the orders to Lahorie and Guidal had been to arrest various government officials,
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Soulier was simply to inform Frochot of the change in regime and to have him make
arrangements for the provisional government's meeting later that day. Wanting to have
everything ready when Malet and the other members of the new regime arrived—and seemingly
unconcerned about having been replaced as Prefect by Boccheiampe—Frochot delegated various
tasks to other officials at the Hôtel de Ville.37 Despite his nearly unquestioning compliance,
Frochot later maintained that he had not been convinced of the legitimacy of the orders he
received. In self-defense, he asserted, "[I] fled to my own house, leaving the two Officers
behind, telling them that I was going to change my boots; but deliberating in my own mind on
what was to be done, and on the means of having an interview with the Prince ArchChancellor."38 Whether he intended to or not, Frochot failed to reach Arch-Chancellor
Cambacérès until late that afternoon, and by then, arrangements for the first meeting of Malet's
new Republican government were in place.
Unlike his previous attempts to overthrow Napoleon's regime, which saw themselves
frustrated from the outset by eavesdroppers, lack of real planning, and tardiness, the plot of 22
October was already Malet's most successful, having been underway for three and a half hours.
By 7:00 a.m., men loyal to Malet's provisional government had subjugated both the Ministry of
Police and Prefecture of Police without resistance.39 Thus far, the plot had unfolded perfectly,
but Malet was not deluded enough to expect that it would continue so smoothly. Having
maintained under his command 150 of the Guardsmen he had obtained earlier that morning, he
set out to achieve what he believed would be one of the most difficult individual tasks of the
entire enterprise, neutralizing the threat posed by Count General Pierre Hulin.40 Hulin was a
determined man who could not be seduced or intimidated into acting against his will. If anyone
were going to thwart the plan, Malet expected it to be Hulin and, therefore, kept for himself the
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task of subduing him.41
Arriving at Hulin's apartment in the Place Vendôme, Malet barged into the bedroom to
find him still sleeping in bed next to his wife.42 Malet immediately launched into the explanation
that Napoleon had died in Moscow and that the Senate had abolished the imperial government,
replacing it with a Republic. Malet had two more announcements for Hulin: that he was under
arrest, and that he, Malet, would replace him in his position as governor of Paris.43 Seeing her
husband baffled into silence, Countess Hulin intervened, hoping to bring her husband back to his
senses. She advised him that if the news delivered were true, Malet would have corresponding
written orders.44 Rousing himself, Hulin asked to see such orders, to which Malet calmly replied
in the affirmative: "Let’s go into your office, I will show it to you,” Malet told him. Once in the
adjoining room, Malet revealed not the orders he claimed to possess but a pistol.45 Without
further elaboration, he shot Hulin in the face. The bullet entered his jaw, but the injury did not
prove fatal.46
Malet next led his troops to the home of Adjutant-General Pierre Doucet, from whom he
expected to acquire authority over more troops. And here, everything began to go wrong. Prior
to setting his plot in motion, Malet had written Doucet a personal letter, an action he thought
would have won the Adjutant-General's allegiance to his cause.47 But upon reviewing the
senatus-consulte, Doucet questioned the validity of the document presented to him.48 Further
complicating the situation was the unforeseeable visit of Alexandre de Laborde, a police
inspector, to Doucet's apartments that morning. His very presence caused a change in Malet's
attitude. His composure dissolved as Laborde, recognizing him as a political malcontent who
was supposed to be locked away in Doctor Dubuisson's rest home, declared, "Monsieur Mallet
[sic], you do not have permission to leave your home unless I come looking for you."49
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Believing himself in another situation where only violence would assure the plot's success, Malet
reached for his pistol. Before he could fire, Laborde and Doucet, wrestled him to the ground and
placed him under arrest.50 Rateau, who had accompanied Malet, vainly cited the senatusconsulte as authorization for the actions taken over the last several hours.51 He drew his sword in
hopes of rescuing the General, but quickly found himself under arrest.52
At roughly 9:45 a.m., Laborde and Doucet brought the two conquered conspirators in
bonds before the soldiers Malet had led to the house. "The Emperor is not dead!" Doucet
exclaimed. "Your father lives still! These men are imposters!"53 Chants of "Vive l'Empereur!"
immediately filled the air, after which the troops returned to their barracks as if nothing out of
the ordinary had occurred, a sign that Malet believed signaled the official end of his plot.54 Not
only was he, the conspiracy's mastermind, in custody, but he had failed to achieve the true
allegiance of the men who had aided his cause thus far. Although the situation was coming
under control, Doucet and Laborde knew that Paris and the imperial regime were not safe until
each of Malet's co-conspirators—both the deliberate and the unwitting—were under arrest. In
fact, had his accomplices been more proactive in their duties, the plot might yet have succeeded
despite Malet's arrest.55
Having replaced the Duke of Rovigo as Minister of Police, Lahorie busied himself not
with the duties of his new position but with finding a tailor to fit him clothing appropriate to his
new position.56 When Inspector Laborde and a detachment of troops arrived at the Ministry, he
announced to Lahorie that he was under arrest for having conspired with General Malet to
overthrow Napoleon's imperial regime. Upon hearing that he had been part of an illegal bid for
political power, he proclaimed his innocence, swearing that he had no knowledge of the
illegitimacy of Malet's claims. He simply believed that he was taking part in yet another
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government change—“I believed I was seeing another 18 Brumaire, and I followed General
Malet, the same way that twelve years ago I had followed Bonaparte”—ushered in by the chaos
of the revolutionary spirit that had pervaded France for more than two decades.57 When Laborde
asked how so sloppy an imitation as the senatus-consulte issued by Malet could deceived him,
Lahorie confessed that he had not read a single line of the document, believing Malet's
explanation of the situation as proof enough of the circumstances facing the nation. Upon
closely inspecting the forgery, Lahorie dejectedly allowed his own arrest, avowing, "It has never
been said that I lacked either intelligence or judgment, and it would be necessary to look upon
me as the most obtuse of men, to pretend that I willingly took part in an imposture so rashly
concocted. No, I was the first dupe of General Malet, and I am his wretched victim."58
The Corsican Boccheiampe was the only one of Malet's unwitting conspirators to take his
position in the government seriously. As soon as he had installed himself as Prefect of the Seine,
he set to work signing the day's paperwork as if his promotion from prisoner to prefect was
nothing out of the ordinary. When Malet's plot began to unravel, however, he was quick to
abandon his post in hope of fleeing the police searching for him. On 24 October, authorities
arrested him when they found him hiding in a nearby residence.59 Unlike Lahorie and
Boccheiampe, who spent at least a brief time in their new offices, Guidal had abandoned his post
immediately after replacing Henri Clarke, Duke of Feltre, as Minister of War. Rather than
undertake the position's duties, he left for a restaurant to have lunch. A detachment of troops
found him, "fork in hand," quickly placed him under arrest, and returned him to prison.60
With each of the conspirators under arrest, the rightful government officials went about
reinstalling themselves in their offices and returning the city to the status quo, a task that was
complete by noon that same day.61 The ruse had been so convincing, however, that Prefect of
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Police Pasquier had a difficult time in re-entering his office, when troops refused to allow him to
enter without an order signed by Malet.62 Prefect of the Seine Frochot, who had given orders for
the preparation of a meeting room for the new provisional government, had no trouble in
retaking his post. He immediately tried to set everything right, hoping to prevent anyone from
suspecting him as a conspirator. Only then did he make his way to Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès
to explain to him what had happened.63
Although the conspiracy enjoyed several hours of success, the Parisian populace was
unaware of the events until the authorities had restored order.64 Malet had hoped that the citizens
would rally to his cause upon hearing that he wanted to return the nation to a Republic and free
them from "tyrannical" Napoleon. His hopes might not have been completely misplaced.
Minister of Police Savary described France as "a country so susceptible to the contagion of
example," seeming to validate Malet's expectation that the nation would rally to support him.65
There was no uprising or any sympathetic sentiment, however, when a brief written statement by
the Minister of Police announcing the plot’s unfolding and subsequent failure, appeared in Le
Moniteur on the morning of 24 October.66 The information provided by Savary was vague,
providing only the names of the plot’s masterminds—Malet, Lahorie, and Guidal—and the
assertion that the disturbances they caused had been minor. In fact, the Journal de Paris
reported enthusiastic cries of Vive l’Empereur! from citizens of all classes when the statement
was read aloud.67 People in the city discussed Malet's plot "as a piece of outrageous folly," if
they bothered to speak of it at all.68 The newspaper emphasized Parisians’ positive reaction for
several days after the conspiracy had taken place. “We insist on this point,” an article from 31
October explained, “because it honors the character of the habitants of Paris, and proves that they
know their true interests, which cannot be separated from respect for the law and love of the
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sovereign.”69
Wanting to maintain the tranquility that had persisted throughout Paris during Malet’s
attempt “to trouble the public order and to substitute legitimate authority with the horrors of
anarchy” and to put the ordeal in the past as quickly as possible, a commission of seven military
officers had been organized on 23 October by Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and Minister of War
Henri Clarke.70 The trial of twenty-four alleged conspirators, including Malet, began four days
later.71 During the trial, several issues hampered the accused men's ability to defend themselves
successfully. Boccheiampe, a Corsican, pointed out that his knowledge of French was
inadequate and might prevent him from understanding the questions the commission presented.
Likewise, they might find his responses difficult to follow. One of the judges quickly replied,
"we will understand you enough."72 None of the defendants were offered legal counsel, and
when Colonel Soulier complained at the outset of the trial, a judge assured him, sarcastically,
that they would have the opportunity to write to lawyers that evening, sniping that "all lawyers
do not go to bed at eight o'clock."73 Malet was quick to reply that by then the "jailers are in bed
and the prisoners are locked down, without light."74 Ultimately, only one of the defendants
managed to obtain the services of a defense counsel, who generously offered to say a few words
on behalf of the other defendants as well.75
Perhaps the most damning aspect of the trial was the judges' preconceived notion of the
men's guilt. Several of the men adopted as their defense the claim that they were simply
unwitting dupes of Malet's deceitful plan, having been wrought with emotion upon hearing of
Napoleon’s untimely death. Jean-François Rabbe, one of the accused, justified himself by
stating that "in losing the Emperor, he lost his protector; he burst into tears and did not think
[about the fact] that in a monarchy the son succeeds the father."76 Colonel Soulier also sought to
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defend his actions in this manner, citing his "twenty-five years of service [and] fourteen injuries"
as evidence against the idea that he would knowingly act against the legitimate French
government.77 He testified, "on account of the illness with which I was afflicted, and the
emotion which the false report of his Majesty's death caused in me, I totally lost my senses."78
Following this explanation, one of the judges snapped at him, declaring that during a crisis when
someone unknown to him declares that the Emperor is dead is precisely the moment when
military and civil officers need to keep their wits about them and handle the situation
appropriately.79 While the military commission failed to accept the validity of such a defense,
Prefect of Police Pasquier believed in the men’s innocence. In his memoirs, he sympathized
with the accused: “The officers of their command sought refuge in the obedience which they
considered they owed to their superiors in rank. It is a fact that among them all, not one was to
be found who could be called intentionally guilty.”80
Each man, excepting Malet, professed his innocence throughout the trial. Some hoped to
save their lives while others had already resigned themselves to the idea of facing the firing
squad. One of the most vocal in proclaiming his virtue, Colonel Soulier, continuously begged
for his life, reminding the panel of judges that he had “a wife and four children.”81 General
Lahorie’s performance at the hearing was stoic. When given the opportunity to address the panel
of judges, he explained, “At all events . . . I am aware of the doom that awaits me; I do not speak
for the purpose of saving my life, but to establish the truth, and to defend my memory from the
odious charges with which it might be sought to dishonor it.”82 Malet made no effort to defend
his actions to the commission, declaring that “the man who has constituted himself the defender
of his country has no need of any defense: he triumphs, or goes to his death.”83
The questioning of Colonel Soulier was unforgiving. As a commanding officer used to
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reviewing official documents he could easily have determined that the ones delivered by General
Malet were forgeries. For example, the order given to him for 100,000 francs had no date and
came from an alleged senatorial meeting on 11 October 1812. When reminded that these
discrepancies—and the fact that Malet had ordered him "to sound the tocsin whenever such a
step might become necessary"—should have confirmed in his mind the illegitimacy of the events
underway, Soulier reiterated that he had been too ill and emotionally distraught to act as he
normally would have.84 The military commission countered by accusing him of supporting
Malet's efforts because of the promotion to General of Brigade and the promised 100,000 francs.
Soulier could only reply, "It was neither one nor the other."85
While the judges did not seem to believe that high-ranking officials could possibly be as
gullible as they claimed, Malet defended each of his alleged accomplices, arguing that they were
simply following the orders of a superior officer, exactly what their training taught them to do.
He added that had any of them not conformed to his wishes, he would have forced them to do
so.86 Clearly, his threat was true, given his shooting of General Hulin. Malet maintained that
"alone he had done everything, trusting for the success of his enterprise to a spontaneous
outburst of the feelings of hatred and indignation experienced by all classes, and which could not
fail to respond to the first given signal."87 During the interrogation, one of the judges asked
Malet directly who his accomplices had been. Again, he explained that he had acted alone, but
added that if his plan had succeeded, he would have been joined by "all of France, even
yourself."88 His willingness "to take upon himself the entire responsibility . . . revealed the
nobility of his character," according to Prefect of Police Pasquier.89 Refusing to accept Malet’s
testimony that he was the plot’s mastermind, historian Frank McLynn attributes the plot to a
wider conspiracy, in which Malet simply happened to be the first actor in “an ad hoc pact
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between royalists and extreme Republicans.”90
After an unusually brief hearing—a mere three days—the military commission reached
its decision concerning the fate of each of the accused, handing down its judgment on 29 October
1812.91 The Journal de Paris promptly printed it the following day. Although the panel
determined "that the entire conspiracy had been the personal work of Malet, and that his
followers were the victims of a lamentable credulity," fourteen men were sentenced to death for
their roles in the plot.92 Twelve of the defendants—including Malet, Lahorie, Guidal, Soulier,
and Rateau—were unanimously condemned to death, while Boccheiampe received the same
sentence by a vote of five to two, and Rabbe by a vote of six to one.93 The remaining ten were
acquitted of any wrongdoing, nine unanimously, and one by a “sufficient majority” of three to
four votes.94 Before 3:00 p.m. on 30 October, when the condemned men made their way to the
Plaine de Grenelle to face the firing squad, Rateau and Rabbe benefited from a last-minute
decision to spare their lives, leading to suspicion that they had confessed to the police crucial
information such as the participants and the working details of Malet’s plot.95 Prefect of Police
Pasquier found Rateau's reprieve especially bewildering. He pointed to Rateau's having been
one of Malet's initial accomplices, "present at the first meeting" when the plot was being
devised.96
The theatrical qualities of the entire ordeal and discrepancies in protocol did not end with
the issuance of the death sentences. Transported to the Plaine de Grenelle in a number of
carriages, the doomed men continued to play the same roles as they had during the trial. Lahorie
remained composed, Soulier constantly mumbled, “my poor children, my poor family,” and
Guidal shouted slurs against Napoleon.97 Eight others traveled in stupefied silence, awestruck
that they had not only been found guilty of participating in a political plot against Napoleon’s
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imperial regime but were to pay for having done so with their lives.98 The loudest performance
was that of General Malet himself. Leaning out the window of his carriage, he yelled to anyone
within hearing distance, "recall the 23rd of October!" and "I fall, but I am not the last of the
Romans."99 He regretted his machinations only because his failure would leave his wife and son
impoverished and at the mercy of his political opponents.100
At the Plaine de Grenelle, the condemned were lined up against a wall, facing the twentyfive man firing squad. Contrary to protocol, Malet himself led the execution. He told his
accomplices to prepare themselves for the volley. The squad fired. Once the smoke had cleared,
Malet could be seen, standing unharmed before the wall, his hand over his heart. The first volley
of bullets had failed to kill two others as well, though it had, at least, knocked them to the
ground. Bordérieux cried out "Vive l'Empereur!" before addressing Malet, "Go, poor soldier,
your emperor received, like you, a mortal strike."101 Staring at his ineffective executioners,
Malet shouted, "Fire again, already!"102 Lahorie, lying on the ground still alive, amended, "me
too, for God's sake!"103 A second volley silenced Bordérieux and Lahorie. Malet, using his last
breath to profess his political ideology, muttered "Vive la liberté" before falling face first to the
ground.104
Napoleon learned of Malet's failed plan against him on 6 November 1812, when he
arrived in Mikhailovka, Russia.105 A waiting messenger described the people involved, outlined
the basic events of the plot, and informed him of the execution of the conspirators. The
willingness with which his high-ranking political and military officials embraced the idea of a
provisional government replacing his own struck him immediately. The security of his empire—
which he thought he had achieved with the birth of his son, the King of Rome—was clearly in
question. Stupefied that a political prisoner could so easily threaten all he had created, Napoleon
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exclaimed to his secretary, Louis de Bourrienne, "It would appear that my crown is not fixed
very firmly on my head if in my own capital the bold stroke of three adventurers can shake it."106
His anger grew as reports from various ministers in Paris arrived. Each man related information
concerning the plot in such a manner as to minimize the role he had played in Malet’s success.
The officials “were ever eager to magnify their own importance at the expense of others.”107
Knowing that news of the catastrophic conditions facing the Grande Armée in Russia was
making its way to Paris, Napoleon worried that public opinion would be even further damaged
given the recent attempt to overthrow his government. He feared that other political opponents,
especially those outside Paris and in conquered territories, would seize the opportunity to act
against him as well. Wanting to manage any ramifications caused by either—or both—
situations, he explained to his advisers who had accompanied him on the Russian campaign that
his presence was required back in his capital city. "In the current state of things," he told them,
"I can only impose on Europe from the Tuileries palace."108 Although the Emperor's statements
show that Malet's conspiracy played a significant role in his decision to leave Russia and return
to Paris, at least one of his close advisers seemed to think otherwise. Foreign Minister Armand
Caulaincourt recorded in his memoirs that "the Emperor . . . thought that this event [Malet's
plot], the enterprise of a madman, would have few—if any—ramifications."109
Napoleon returned to the Tuileries palace in Paris during the middle of the night on 18
December 1812.110 Over the next several days, he met with the Senate, each member of which
was anxious to impress upon him his undying loyalty. Just as in the ministerial reports he read in
Russia, the senators sought to reduce the significance of the events, seeking to assure the
Emperor that his reign enjoyed solid support. Senator Louis-Philippe, Count of Ségur swore
allegiance—his own, and that of the Senate as a whole—to Napoleon and the dynasty that would
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follow him: “In your absence a detestable plot was framed; some madman attempted to shake
what genius and courage had founded. . . . We are ready to sacrifice every thing for your sacred
person, for the perpetuation of your dynasty. Deign to receive this new oath: we will remain
faithful to it till death.”111 Despite promises of loyalty from high-ranking military and political
officials, Napoleon’s regime never enjoyed the stability that pre-Revolutionary dynasties had.

94

CONCLUSION
The French Revolution ushered in a period of political unrest and constant upheaval in
France which appeared never-ending, even when a seemingly stable government rose to power.
After a series of failed Republican governments, Napoleon Bonaparte seized control on 18
Brumaire VIII (9 November 1799), promising to uphold the revolutionary ideals—liberté,
égalité, and fraternité—that had permeated the nation. As time passed, however, it became clear
that the new leader aimed at gathering all political power for himself. With his consular and
imperial regimes accepted and even welcomed by French citizens, Napoleon effectively returned
the country to autocratic rule.
The First Consul-turned-Emperor understood that he needed the support of French
citizens from all ranks of society to ensure the stability of his rule. The peasants and working
class had championed him since his initial political conquest because they felt that he personified
the hopes of the common Frenchman: having risen through the ranks because of his talent and
ability, not through any perceived right or privilege afforded by a noble birth. They expected the
brilliant military commander not only to deliver constant military victories but also to keep their
best interests in mind. Although the political allegiance of the lower classes seemed secure,
Napoleon understood that guaranteeing the permanence of his Empire would also depend on the
support of capable and experienced officials, men whose faithfulness was more questionable.
Needing talented officials to serve in his military, ministries, and prefectures, Napoleon
was forced to enlist the services of men whose ideologies ranged from Republican, to
monarchist, to imperialists. Shortly after having seized power, Napoleon, as First Consul, wrote
to his brother Joseph, "I have composed my Council of State of ex-members of the Constituent
Assembly, of moderates, Feuillants, Royalists, Jacobins. I am national: I like honest men of all
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colours."1 Relying on officials whose political beliefs conflicted with those of their fellow coworkers and with the current regime engendered instability within his new government.
Napoleon did not fear the potentially dangerous situation, believing instead that with time the
hostilities generated during the Revolutionary past would fade and allow his officials to dedicate
themselves sincerely to his regime. These men did profess their loyalty to him, though their
sincerity was constantly in doubt. Many of them were simply willing to suppress their ideologies
in order to maintain their positions in the government, an attitude that Napoleon accepted,
believing that it would eventually transition into true allegiance.
Joseph Fouché was a known Jacobin supporter who found himself appointed Minister of
Police during Napoleon’s various regimes. After Napoleon’s initial abdication in 1814, Fouché
warned the newly-installed King Louis XVIII that the Emperor might try to return to France and
retake political control. Simultaneously, he worked—albeit, in vain—with Bonapartists to
declare a Regency for the King of Rome, Napoleon II. As Fouché predicted, Napoleon returned
and led the nation for a brief period known as the Hundred Days—the length of time Louis
XVIII would be forced to flee from Paris. Once again he chose Fouché to be Minister of
Police—because he was the most experienced, talented, and capable man available for the
position. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo prompted the politically fickle Fouché to seek the
Emperor’s second abdication and to restore Louis XVIII. This assistance to the Bourbon family
earned him the right to maintain his position as Minister of Police under the new regime. Further
evidence of Fouché’s willingness to serve his own best interest was the document he provided
Louis XVIII listing the people—his close friends and co-workers included—who had
compromised their integrity by serving Napoleon during the Hundred Days, though his own
name should have appeared on this list as well.2
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Napoleon's expectation of stability despite his officials' conflicting, and often insincere,
political opinions—the danger of which he seems to have underestimated—never came to
fruition. Both his consular and imperial regimes frequently faced adversarial malcontents
determined to destroy what he had established. The disjointedness of his officials' ideologies
weakened the structure of government, making it possible for any enterprising political hopeful
to strike a devastating blow against the Empire and even potentially to topple it completely. Not
fully recognizing the fragility within his bureaucracy, Napoleon believed that though the
allegiance of his highest-ranking political and military officials was perpetually in question, the
relative prosperity and comfort enjoyed by the peasants and working class, coupled with his
many victories on the battlefield, would provide sufficient stability to preserve his rule.
Ultimately, even these aspects, which he had previously provided so easily, began to fail
the Emperor. In the later years of his regime, Napoleon's military triumphs lessened, and the
nation's enemies drew closer to Paris. As his hold on popular opinion diminished, he faced
increasing danger from his officials and the weakness caused by their conflicting political
ideologies. The very men who had, at least outwardly, sworn allegiance to the imperial
government forced their sovereign to abdicate on 6 April 1814. The end of the Napoleonic
Empire was a long-sought victory for the Bourbon supporters vanquished by the chaos of the
Revolution. Having replaced the Emperor with royal pretender Louis XVIII, monarchists hoped
to return France to a pre-Revolutionary state, or at the very least to a constitutional monarchy.
Because the imperial interlude had not subdued the unrest ushered in by the Revolution, the
newly reestablished Bourbon monarchy was destined to face upheaval.
Napoleon returned to France from his exile on the island of Elba and retook political
control of the nation. The past and now present Emperor announced to French citizens that his
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own rule had been deposed through the treachery of some of his military and political officials.
Such declarations vilified the monarchy, allowing Napoleon to gather support for the Empire
again. His second attempt at ruling the nation would not enjoy long-term success, however, as
his most vehement opponents—other European leaders—had been meeting at the Congress of
Vienna since 1 November 1814 to establish a lasting European peace settlement out of the
disorder caused first by the Restoration and then by Napoleon’s reign. Assisting the leaders in
an advisory position was Talleyrand, a man who had, at times, aided the Emperor’s cause while
simultaneously actively seeking to destroy it. After suffering defeat at Waterloo on 18 June
1815, Napoleon offered to abdicate in favor of his young son, now just over four years old. The
European powers rejected the proposal and restored Louis XVIII to the throne—again.
Louis XVIII reigned until his death in 1824, at which point his brother, Charles X
succeeded him. This succession was the only regular transfer of political power in France during
the nineteenth century. Although rule had successfully passed from one king to another in
traditional style, the monarchical system was by no means secure. After a six year rule, a new
revolution in 1830 forced Charles X to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Count of
Chambord. Instead, the liberal-minded Chamber of Deputies elected as France’s next monarch,
Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orléans, from the cadet branch of the Bourbon family, thereby creating
the July Monarchy. Even three consecutive royal leaders could not, however, ensure the
continuation of the monarchy.
Just as he had gained power through revolution, Louis-Philippe would lose it in the same
manner. The Revolutions of 1848—a Europe-wide phenomenon—brought France a Republic,
the moment General Malet had always desired. On 10 December 1848, universal manhood
suffrage elected Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon’s eldest nephew, as the so-called Second
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Republic’s President, the first time such a position existed in France. Despite Republican
beginnings, his political aspirations echoed those of his uncle, and the Second Republic soon
came to an end. On 2 December 1852, France entered into the Second Empire, led by Emperor
Napoleon III—Napoleon’s son, the King of Rome, was granted the name Napoleon II though he
never ruled. Napoleon III was not only the nation’s first President but also its last monarch. At
the battle of Sedan (2 September 1870) during the Franco-Prussian War, the Emperor was taken
prisoner. When the news arrived in Paris two days later, his imperial regime was deposed by
Republicans, declaring the Third Republic. Although France’s Republics have changed over
time—the nation is currently in its fifth—the system has endured. Revolutionary and Republican
ideals finally found their place in French politics, but not until long after the name of General
Claude-François de Malet had faded from memory.
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